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I. INTRODUCTION
In the first week of June 2020, former Secretary of Defense James
Mattis, a retired United States Marine Corps general with substantial
wartime experience, along with other retired senior military officers
took the unusual step of condemning President Donald Trump for his
response to nation-wide demonstrations demanding equal justice and
an end to the existence of systemic and institutional racism.1 Shortly
afterward, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell
(who had also served as the Sixty-Fifth Secretary of State), likewise
argued that President Trump “drifted away” from the Constitution
and undermined democracy.2 Joining Powell and Mattis were, as a
sampling, retired Admiral Michael Mullen, and retired generals John
Allen, Martin Dempsey, Michael Hayden, and Tony Thomas.3 This led
to more than one pundit questioning whether the senior officers who
opposed President Trump were unwise, if not constitutionally igno-
rant, in their actions.4 For instance, Victor Davis Hansen, an emeritus
professor, alleged that several of the retired generals and admirals op-
1. See Jeffrey Goldberg, James Mattis Denounces President Trump, Describes Him
as a Threat to the Constitution, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/james-mattis-denounces-trump-
protests-militarization/612640 [https://perma.unl.edu/J57N-HPMT]; David E.
Sanger & Helene Cooper, Military Vets Break Silence on President, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2020, at A1.
2. Michelle Hackman, Colin Powell Says Trump Has ‘Drifted Away’ from U.S. Con-
stitution, WALL STREET J., June 7, 2020.
3. Fred Kaplan, The Officers’ Revolt, SLATE (June 3, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/trump-commanders-esper-mullen-
miller.html [https://perma.unl.edu/E2A7-RXYT]; Paul LeBlanc, Retired Marine
Gen. John Allen: Trump’s Threats of Military Force May Be ‘The Beginning of the
End of the American Experiment,’ CNN (June 4, 2020, 2:14 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/06/04/politics/john-allen-trump-protests-george-floyd/in-
dex.html [https://perma.unl.edu/54AM-5YQE]; Mike Mullen, I Cannot Remain
Silent, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/
06/american-cities-are-not-battlespaces/612553 [https://perma.unl.edu/7EMM-
BHG6].
4. See, e.g., Hugh Hewitt, No, Colin Powell. Trump Isn’t the One Who’s ‘Drifted’ from
the Constitution, WASH. POST (June 9, 2020, 2:09 PM), https://www.washin.com/
opinions/2020/06/09/how-colin-powell-got-away-with-an-unjustified-trump-about-
constitution/ [https://perma.unl.edu/XU72-R9PE]; Michael J. Stricof, Should Mil-
itary Officers Like Jim Mattis Enter the Political Arena?, WASH. POST, June 4,
2020.
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posing the administration’s actions used “contemptuous words”
against President Trump and then suggested that a court-martial
might be a reasonable response.5 Others, such as Peter Feaver and
James Golby, argued that the military’s high approval rating and un-
rivaled public trust is placed in jeopardy by such conduct of retired
generals and admirals.6
Yet, those pundits who were critical of the retired generals and ad-
mirals overlooked two basic features of the Constitution’s demand for
the military’s subordination to the civil government. First, the Consti-
tution was designed with the fear of standing armies in mind.7 To that
end, the Constitution’s framers intended for weakened presidential
ability to order the military to perform domestic police-type duties.8
As articulated by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, one of the foremost grievances of the men who led the Revolu-
tion against the Crown in 1776 was King George III’s use of military
forces to police the colonies.9
It is critical to place into context the events which led to the actions
of Powell and the other retired senior officers (hereafter Powell et al.).
Hundreds of thousands of United States citizens and residents exer-
cised their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and to peaceably
assemble in protests after the police killing of George Floyd, an un-
armed, Black United States citizen in Minneapolis.10 President
Trump threatened, if not attempted, to order the active duty military
5. See Victor Davis Hanson, Not-So-Retiring Retired Military Leaders, NAT’L REV.
(June 7, 2020, 8:58 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/not-so-retiring-
retired-military-leaders/amp/ [https://perma.unl.edu/2JYY-BAC7].
6. See, e.g., Thomas Burke & Eric Reid, Retired Military Endorsements Erode Public
Trust in the Military, BROOKINGS: ORDER FROM CHAOS (June 30, 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/30/retired-military-endorse-
ments-erode-public-trust-in-the-military [https://perma.unl.edu/2RCZ-DHSD].
7. See e.g., Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 65–67 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. Perhaps, because the framers cited as grievance George III’s mandatory station-
ing of forces in the private houses of his colonial subjects, the fear of a standing
army was further amplified in the Constitution’s framers. See, e.g., David E. Eng-
dahl, Soldiers Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in
Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18–31 (1971); Jonathan Turley, The Military
Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002).
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14–16 (U.S. 1776). Jefferson wrote of
George III, “He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to
the Civil power.” Id. at para. 13.
10. See, e.g., Fiery Clashes Erupt Between Police and Protesters over George Floyd
Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/min-
neapolis-floyd-protests.html [https://perma.unl.edu/RVY2-SKBW]. The First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. On the right to assemble to seek redress, see
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to police cities experiencing spikes in unrest.11 There is both a consti-
tutional and statutory infirmity to President Trump’s actions. The In-
surrection Act of 1807 and the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 limit the
ability of a president to use the military for domestic law enforcement
reasons.12 In spite of these limitations, President Trump, with the ap-
parent support of Attorney General William Barr and the acquies-
cence of both Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and a combat-fatigue,
uniformed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley,
emerged from a security bunker to tour the St. John’s Episcopal
Church while unidentifiable law enforcement, including the possible
use of the active duty military and National Guard, used or displayed
less-than-lethal weaponry against citizen-demonstrators.13
Nationwide violence did, in fact, occur, even though the majority of
the demonstrators had peaceful intentions and the sources of violence
have been muddied throughout social media. It is possible that an
unaligned confluence of independent persons subscribing to right-
wing ideologies and persons with anarchic or far-left goals aided the
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960).
11. See Peter Bergen, Why Mattis’ Verdict on Trump Is Devastating, CNN (June 4,
2020, 7:43 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/opinions/mattis-thinks-trump-
risks-america-bergen/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/63UQ-RZG5]; David Ig-
natius, Why Mattis and Mullen Toppled Their Bridge of Silence, WASH. POST
(June 4, 2020, 5:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-mattis-
and-mullen-toppled-their-bridge-of-silence/2020/06/04/c71b8f58-a698-11ea-bb20-
ebf0921f3bbd_story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/3GTW-TFED].
12. The Insurrection Act of 1807 is codified at, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006)). The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act is codi-
fied at ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385
(2000)). The Posse Comitatus Act reads:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). While it is true that The Posse Comitatus Act applies
only to the Army, and by implication, the Air Force, the Department of Defense
Instructions extend the Act to the Navy and Marine Corps. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., INSTRUCTION No. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AGENCIES 24 (2013). On the exemption of the Department of the Navy from
the Act, see United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1986). But see United
States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974).
13. See, e.g., Courtney Kube, Carol E. Lee & Rich Schapiro, Esper Revises Account of
What He Knew About Trump’s Photo Op, NBC NEWS (June 2, 2020, 2:55 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-s-church-photo-op-took-de-
fense-secretary-esper-gen-n1222391 [https://perma.unl.edu/T9PJ-HSWS]; Doyle
McManus, Trump Finds Unexpected Center of Resistance: The Pentagon, L.A.
TIMES (June 7, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-
07/column-trump-finds-an-unexpected-center-of-resistance-the-pentagon.
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violence through electronic messaging and physical participation.14
Instances of violence included fatal attacks on police officers trying to
maintain peace, as well looting and arson on private properties and
government buildings.15 Mass upheavals have occurred before in
American history, but the degree to which retired senior military of-
ficers with substantial command and combat experience characterized
a sitting president as a threat to the Constitution, and therefore unfit
to hold the position of Commander in Chief, is remarkable.16 But as
remarkable as the actions of the former officers are, their actions were
not unforeseeable.
One example, but by no means the only, of the foreseeability of the
public criticisms of President Trump from Powell et al. occurred less
than one year before the demonstrations. On October 18, 2019, retired
Admiral William H. McRaven, the former commanding officer of the
United States Navy Seals, penned an op-ed in the New York Times
excoriating President Trump for abandoning the United States’ allies,
as well as leaving myriad of oppressed ethnic minorities across the
globe to try to survive under dictatorial regimes. Titled Our Republic
Is under Attack from the President, McRaven’s article was not a call to
overthrow President Trump, but rather, for the nation’s voters to find
a new national leader through the electoral process.17 McRaven also
publicly condemned President Trump’s pardons of service members
convicted or accused of war-crime type offenses.18 McRaven couched
his criticisms as permissible within the “military ethos,” yet some
14. See, e.g., Alexander Mallin, Evidence That Antifa, ‘Foreign Actors’ Involved in
Sowing Unrest and Violence: AG Barr, ABC NEWS (June 4, 2020, 1:55 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ag-barr-evidence-antifa-foreign-actors-involved-
sowing/story?id=71066996 [https://perma.unl.edu/62DK-7YK9]; Clarence Page,
While Trump Blames Antifa, a Menacing Far-Right ‘Boogaloo’ Movement Rises,
CHI. TRIB. (June 5, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/clarence-
page/ct-column-trump-antifa-fbi-page-20200605-fdviqcg44rdb7pin2moh3nnl2u-
story.html; Craig Timber, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Souad Mekhennet, Men Wearing
Hawaiian Shirts and Carrying Guns Add a Volatile New Element to Protests,
WASH. POST (June 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/
03/white-men-wearings-hawaiian-shirts-carrying-guns-add-volatile-new-ele-
ment-floyd-protests/ [https://perma.unl.edu/G8XM-X8J4].
15. Mallin, supra note 14.
16. The Dorr Rebellion is an example of a mass upheaval in which federal forces were
not used against demonstrations. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & STEPHEN DYCUS,
SOLDIERS ON THE HOME FRONT: THE DOMESTIC ROLE OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY
58–59 (2016); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION: A STUDY IN AMERI-
CAN RADICALISM 1833–1849, 116–27 (1973).
17. William H. McRaven, Our Republic Is Under Attack from the President, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2019, at A27.
18. David Choi, Retired Navy SEAL Who Oversaw the 2011 Osama bin Laden Raid
Says Trump ‘Needs to Be Very Careful’ About Pardoning Service Members Ac-
cused of War Crimes, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2019, 7:59 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/navy-seal-mcraven-trump-pardoning-war-crimes-20
19-5 [https://perma.unl.edu/6XWS-GBSE].
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scholars and pundits criticized him as undermining the traditional
civil-military relations construct.19
If it were possible to view McRaven’s conduct without assessing
whether the viewpoints he champions are “good for democracy” or
“bad for democracy,” a historical analysis will evidence that the cur-
rent environment of retired generals and admirals taking political po-
sitions is hardly a danger to the Republic. This history includes
retired generals who have vied for the presidency in wartime, as well
as those who publicly tried to delegitimize a presidential administra-
tion. Indeed, United States history is replete with retired generals
who publicly espoused disruption to the government, often for right-
wing causes. And, while there is a broad consensus that the military
must remain apolitical, elected officials, their staffs, and their sup-
porters, rather than retired senior officers alone, make the goal of an
apolitical military more difficult.20 Although debates on whether the
political speech and criticisms against presidential administrations by
retired senior officers undermines the professional officer ethos are
certainly worthwhile, it is, in light of the nation’s military and politi-
cal history, a gross distortion to claim that the conduct of Powell et al.
undermines either the Constitution or imperils the goal of an apoliti-
cal military.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II begins with a brief
study of the framers’ standing army fears. Within this study is a rec-
ognition that while the Insurrection Act of 1807 and the Posse Comita-
tus Act of 1878 set limits on the use of the military in the United
States, the two acts have historically been non-justiciable in the
courts. The Part next presents a case study of General George Van
Horn Mosely, who retired from the Army as the deputy chief of staff—
the second general in command—in 1938. It is the premise of this
study that because Moseley actively campaigned to undermine Presi-
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and align the United States to Nazi
ideology, he was, notionally, the most dangerous of retirees. Yet, the
19. Edward Chang, Why Retired Military Officers Need To Shut Up About Politics,
FEDERALIST (Oct. 23, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/10/23/why-retired-mil-
itary-officers-need-to-shut-up-about-politics/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Z677-NQ97];
Charles Dunlap, Why an Apolitical Military Is So Important in an Era of an “All-
Volunteer” Force, DUKE: LAWFIRE (Sept. 21, 2019), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/
2019/09/21/why-an-apolitical-military-is-so-important-in-an-era-of-an-all-volun-
tary-force/ [https://perma.unl.edu/D925-ZTBK]; Michael Junge, The Retired Ad-
miral, the President, and the Military Profession, DEF. ONE (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/08/retired-admiral-president-and-mili-
tary-profession/150673/ [https://perma.unl.edu/WZG4-5U5Q].
20. On Haig, see YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF PRESI-
DENTIAL ELECTIONS 137 (2001). On Clark, see Steven J. Farnsworth & S. Robert
Lichter, How Television Covers the Presidential Nomination Process, in THE MAK-
ING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 2008, at 75, 89 (William G. Mayer ed.,
2008).
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United States’ institutions of government remained strong because of
the elected government’s overall respect for them. The Part concludes
with an analysis of the Department of Defense’s ability to recall re-
tired senior officers to duty for the purpose of court-martial or lesser
modes of administrative discipline. That is, the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) has a specific provision on military jurisdiction
over retired service members. The UCMJ also codifies as military
crimes officers using “contemptuous” words against a president, vice
president, and other senior civilian officials; solicitation to commit
mutiny; and, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. Thus, if
the administration truly believed that Powell et al. engaged in conduct
designed to delegitimize the presidency, they could certainly recall the
allegedly offending retired general to duty for a court-martial or ad-
ministrative proceeding.
Part III analyzes the political conduct of presidential aspirants
who had been professional military officers as well as the conduct of
their supporters. Between 1836 and 1952, six retired generals sought
the presidency to the point that they became a formal candidate of a
major party. Two of the aspirants, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott,
were Whig Party nominees. A third, George Brinton McClellan, em-
braced what he considered to be “Whig Principles,” though he ran as a
Democrat because the Whig Party had collapsed prior to the 1856 elec-
tion and was no longer in existence.21 In 1868, Ulysses Grant ran for
the presidency as a Republican as did Dwight David Eisenhower in
1952. And, in 1880, Winfield Scott Hancock, a career general, ran for
the presidency as the Democratic Party candidate. Although not ex-
amined in detail, there were four other career generals who sought the
presidency, but who did not ascend to become a candidate through the
nomination process. Leonard Wood in 1920, and Douglas MacArthur
in 1952, undertook efforts to become a nominee but fell short in doing
so at their respective party conventions.22 In 1988, Alexander Haig
campaigned in the initial Republican primaries; additionally, Wesley
Clark did so in 2004, in the early Democrat primaries.23
21. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. SEARS, GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN: THE YOUNG NAPOLEON 35
(1999).
22. On Leonard Wood’s efforts, see JACK C. LANE, ARMED PROGRESSIVE: GENERAL LE-
ONARD WOOD 244–45 (2009). Wood initially led in the 1920 Republican Conven-
tion voting but could not surpass the required number of votes. Id. Warren G.
Harding became the Republican nominee on the tenth round of balloting. Id.
Douglas MacArthur received ten votes in the second and final round of the 1952
Republican Convention. See H.W. BRANDS, THE GENERAL VS. THE PRESIDENT:
MACARTHUR AND TRUMAN AT THE BRINK OF WAR NUCLEAR WAR 388–90 (2017).
23. On Alexander Haig’s attempted candidacy, see Kenneth E. John, The Polls—A
Report: 1980-1988 New Hampshire Presedential Primary Polls, 53 PUB. OPINION
Q. 590, 600 (1989). On Clark’s efforts, see Jodi Wilgoren, Dean Woos Fans of
Clark, Who Is Said to Support Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A21.
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Part IV presents case studies of retired generals who sought to
make an impact on major political, social, and legal issues confronting
the nation. The case studies include, retired Army generals Edwin
Walker and John Singlaub, and retired United States Marine Corps
general David Shoup. Walker—though not technically retired as a re-
sult of resigning his commission—and Singlaub were staunch anti-
communists who accused presidential administrations of being “soft”
on communism. This Article posits that while neither approached the
level of Moseley, there is a linear relationship from Moseley to Walker,
and then to Singlaub. The case study on Shoup includes mention of
retired Marine Corps general Smedley Butler, and Army generals
Matthew Ridgway and James Gavin, who, like Shoup, openly opposed
the United States involvement in the Vietnam Conflict. Each of the
case studies, and for that matter the analysis of Moseley in Part II,
contains news coverage of events in footnotes. The purpose of news
reporting as a source is not merely to verify that an event occurred but
rather to highlight that there was a widespread awareness of the con-
duct of the retired generals. Finally, within each of the case studies is
an additional important facet. All of the retired generals had elected
legislators backing their actions.
The conclusion, in Part V, places into context the public statements
of Powell et al. in light of the presidential conduct. This conduct in-
cludes President Trump’s threats to use military force to augment or
replace policing in Washington D.C. and other cities, as well as the
character of his journey to the St. John’s Episcopal Church. Additional
aspects to contextualize the statements of Powell et al. include Presi-
dent Trump’s favorable treatment, including pardons, of former ser-
vice members convicted of offenses which could be defined as “war-
crimes;” the negative treatment of an active duty officer who fulfilled
his constitutional duty to testify to Congress; and the appointment of
a retired general to a key policy position in the military establishment
who had articulated racist comments and invective toward the prior
administration. The conclusory thesis of this Article is that, in light of
unique presidential powers over the military, when presidents who re-
spect basic governmental institutions are challenged by the criticism
of generals and admirals, neither the country nor the military itself
should fear an erosion in civil-military relations. But, because Presi-
dent Trump has displayed little respect for the apolitical role of the
military, the statements of Powell et al. are not simply defensible,
they are critical to reinforcing the military’s subordination to the civil
government.
There are five additional matters important to assessing the state-
ments and actions of Powell et al. First, although retired senior of-
ficers have engaged in political activities, particularly regarding their
opposition to military cuts and the need for military readiness, this
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Article addresses only broader challenges to presidential policies
outside of a strictly defense policy. Thus, while the “Revolt of the Ad-
mirals” in 1948–1949 can contribute to a discourse on the expected
role of retired generals and admirals, the so-called revolt was a chal-
lenge to President Harry S. Truman’s administration favoring re-
source allocation for the newly-formed Air Force over the Navy.24
None of Truman’s opponents from the retired ranks accused him of
sabotaging the national defense by an unconstitutional action, or for
the benefit of an opposing nation.25 Second, because most of the con-
temporary writing on the alleged threats to civil-military relations do
not delve into the U.S. military’s legal history, the arguments tend
toward a polemical, rather than scholarly, approach. Of course, a law
review article has length limits, but in analyzing the present actions
of Powell et al. against important constitutional norms such as the
fear of standing armies and prior case studies, it becomes clear that
there is no direct threat to the Constitution or the Republic by their
actions. Third, this Article is partly premised on the concept of lex non
scripta. Defined as an unwritten law found in custom, lex non scripta
remains a source of military law.26 So too, within this Article, does lex
non scripta serve as a barometer for assessing norms of civil-military
relations. To this end, this Article is based on archival research and
does not merely rely on secondary sources, including, as a sampling,
research from the Library of Congress, National Archives and Records
Administration, and the special collections libraries of Mississippi
State University, Arizona State University, and Gettysburg College.
Fourth, for the purpose of this Article, the term “professional of-
ficer” only includes those senior officers who were in uniform for a full
career rather than those brought into the military and commissioned
at high rank, such as had commonly occurred in the War of 1812 and
the Civil War. Historically, during expansions of the Army, private
citizens have been commissioned at high rank and are not included in
this category. Although this definition may appear arbitrary, it would
exclude, for example, Andrew Jackson, even though he served in the
24. On the Revolt of the Admirals, see JEFFREY G. BARLOW, REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS:
THE FIGHT FOR NAVAL AVIATION, 1945–1950, at 1–3 (1994). Professor Barlow
notes that Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was concerned about the role of
retired generals and admirals making public statements on “issues effecting the
National Military Establishment.” Id. at 199.
25. PAOLO E. COLETTA, THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND DEFENSE UNIFICATION
1947–1953, at 169–80 (1981).
26. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 42 (Boston, Little, Brown,
and Co. 1896). As defined by Winthrop, the military’s lex non scripta consists of
the “customs of the service” and “[t]he unwritten laws and customs of war.” Id.;
see also United States v. Pitasi, 20 C.M.A. 601 (1971) (quoting Winthrop for the
meaning of lex non scripta). Winthrop maintained the importance of military law
throughout the Articles of War and courts-martial procedures. See, e.g., JOSHUA
E. KASTENBERG, THE BLACKSTONE OF MILITARY LAW 237–38 (2009).
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Revolutionary War against Britain and obtained the rank of major
general during the War of 1812.27 In between these two wars, Jackson
was a lawyer, a United States senator, a Tennessee Supreme Court
justice, and a wealthy plantation owner.28 After leading militia and
regular forces to a victory over the British at New Orleans, Jackson
remained in the Army and commanded forces in Florida during the
Seminole War.29 He resigned from the Army in 1821 and unsuccess-
fully ran for the presidency in 1824, before being elected president in
1828 and reelected four years later.30 Jackson was a military hero but
also politically controversial prior to his presidency.31 Indeed, shortly
after the victory over the British in New Orleans, Jackson had a fed-
eral judge arrested who had ordered him to release civilians held for
court-martial.32 The definition would also exclude William Henry
Harrison, who was feted by the Whig Party as a military hero in the
elections of 1836 and 1840 but had never qualified for either the lim-
ited Revolutionary War or War of 1812 pensions.33
Finally, although this Article is premised on the conduct of retir-
ees, it is helpful to review their conduct through a civil-military rela-
tions lens as first advanced by Samuel Huntington. Huntington was a
political science professor and national security advisor to President
James Earl Carter.34 In 1957, Huntington published the Soldier and
the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, a work
that several other scholars have labeled the classic theory of civil-mili-
tary relations in the United States.35 He insisted that one of the fun-
damental keys to maintaining military professionalism was for the
27. See LYNN H. PARSONS, THE BIRTH OF MODERN POLITICS: ANDREW JACKSON, JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS, AND THE ELECTION OF 1828, at 5–19 (2011); SEAN WILENTZ, AN-
DREW JACKSON 14–18 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 2005).
28. 1 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE,
1767–1821 (1977).
29. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN
243–45 (2005).
30. HARVEY L. SCHANTZ, Sectionalism in Presidential Elections, in AMERICAN PRESI-
DENTIAL ELECTIONS: PROCESS, POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 101–02 (Harvey L.
Schantz ed., 1996).
31. ROBERT V. REMINI, HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE UNION 161–68 (1991).
32. See 1 JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, 1775–1950, at 11–16 (1992).
33. RICHARD J. ELLIS, OLD TIP VS. THE SLY FOX: THE 1840 ELECTION AND THE MAKING
OF A PARTISAN NATION 188 (2020).
34. ERWIN C. HARGROVE, JIMMY CARTER AS PRESIDENT: LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICS
OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 120–49 (1999).
35. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS
OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957). On Huntington’s influence and reputation,
see Edward M. Coffman, The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State, 55 J.
MIL. HIST. 69, 69 (1991); Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the
Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 805–06 (2012).
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military to remain outside of the nation’s politics.36 The objective con-
trol by civilians over the military, to Huntington, enabled military
professionalism to accrue to the benefit of the United States without
politicizing the military.37 Huntington had other observations on civil-
military relations which are important to analyzing the case studies
listed below as well as assessing President Trump’s conduct and the
responses from the retired generals and admirals. Huntington posited
that since the end of World War II Congress took an increased interest
in military affairs, which led to an increased politicization of the mili-
tary, particularly in regard to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s investiga-
tions and the military’s responses.38
In each of the case studies presented in this Article, members of
Congress advocated for the political positions espoused by the retired
general and highlighted the general’s words for the purpose of attack-
ing a presidency. In subsequent editions of his book, Huntington did
not address the individuals in this Article. Indeed, Huntington wrote
very little on the duties of retired officers, though he noted that be-
cause the military lacked a formal retirement system prior to the Civil
War, generals and admirals often remained in their positions until
they “died in their boots.”39 To be sure, there were various pension
acts passed by Congress for veterans of the War for Independence as
well as the 1812 War with Britain, but these applied to only a limited
number of veterans and did not accrue until the veteran reached an
advanced age.40 As a result, some of the examples analyzed in this
Article occurred at a time when retired generals remained on active
duty simply because there was no legal category for “retired status.”
II. FEARS OF A STANDING ARMY, GEORGE VAN HORN
MOSELEY, AND RETIREE JURISDICTION
In 1784, the Congress of the Confederation (the name for Congress
under the Articles of Confederation) passed legislation which practi-
36. Pearlstein, supra note 35, at 807–09.
37. HUNTINGTON, supra note 35, at 85. Huntington penned:
The one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimiz-
ing of military power. Objective civilian control achieves this reduction
by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile
and neutral. This produces the lowest possible level of military political
power with respect to all civilian groups. At the same time it preserves
that essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of a
military profession.
Id.
38. Id. at 460.
39. Id. at 207.
40. See, e.g., ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF PUB-
LIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 125–27 (2003); WILLIAM HENRY GLAS-
SON, HISTORY OF MILITARY PENSION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 25–31
(1900).
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cally abolished a federal army and began with the words “[a]nd
whereas, standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the
principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a
free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for es-
tablishing despotism . . . .”41 In spite of the Constitution’s framers’
fears of a standing army, the framers created the possibility of a
small, yet permanent, military caste by not mandating the termina-
tion of military jurisdiction when an officer retires. And in more than
one instance, retired generals have sought to change national politics.
George Van Horn Moseley presents an example of a retired general
who not only entered into the political arena but who sought to delegi-
timize the Roosevelt and Truman administrations both in the United
States and abroad. And, while there had been a mechanism for a pres-
ident to recall the retired general for the purpose of a court-martial,
Roosevelt did not do so, thereby adding to the lex non scripta of civil-
military relations.
A. Standing Army Fears
There is a broad consensus that the Constitution’s framers be-
lieved that a standing army was a danger to the liberties of citizens.42
Secondarily, the framers also tended to have a philosophical view that
a standing army was incompatible with civil virtue.43 Part of the
framers’ philosophical views against standing armies had to do with
the construct of both the small British Army as well as the larger con-
tinental European armies, which were often soldiered by what was
considered the “dregs of society,” including criminals and “men with-
out morals.”44 Professor John Childs, a leading scholar of British mili-
tary history, characterized the British Army of William III
(1689–1702) as resembling “a giant sponge which had soaked up much
41. WILLIAM ADDLEMAN GANOE, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 90 (1924);
Lawrence Delbert Cress, Republican Liberty and National Security: American
Military Policy as an Ideological Problem, 1783 to 1789, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 73
(Jan. 1981).
42. Their fear emanated from the English Whig concerns regarding standing armies.
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 350
(Boston, Little Brown, & Co. 1871); Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing
Army Tradition and the Separate Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135, 145–47
(2006).
43. Robert Leider, Federalism and the Military Power of the United States, 73 VAND.
L. REV. 989, 996 (2020) (citing CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT
WAR 354–56 (1979)).
44. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
53 (1998); DAVID PARROTT, THE BUSINESS OF WAR: MILITARY ENTERPRISE AND MIL-
ITARY REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 157–61 (2012); PETER H.WILSON,
THE THIRTY YEARS WAR: EUROPE’S TRAGEDY 212 (2009).
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of the dross and dirt of English society.”45 However vulgar the idea of
a standing army was to civic virtue, the standing army fears were
rooted in a belief that a military commander or a president could use
an army under his command to topple the Constitution.46
According to Professor Richard Kohn, one of the leading scholars of
civil-military relations, “[n]o principle of government was more widely
understood or more completely accepted . . . than the danger of a
standing army in peacetime.”47 The Supreme Court has also observed
that the founders adopted the English Whig’s fears of standing armies
and that this became an influence in shaping the Constitution.48 A
small degree of elaboration highlights the coupling of the fear of a
standing army with an executive who commands over it in ignorance
of laws governing the military. In 1642, John March articulated Par-
liament’s claim that the Crown could not be considered a supreme
commander over the militia because Parliament itself established the
military law.49 In 1689, with the passage of the Mutiny Act, William
and Mary were precluded from determining the extent of military ju-
risdiction in Britain, and the maintenance of the standing army was
subject to annual renewal by Parliament.50 In passing the Mutiny Act,
Parliament declared a general military law principle that “noe Man
may be forejudged of Life or Limbe or subjected to any kinde of pun-
ishment by Martiall Law or in any other manner then by the Judge-
ment of his Peeres and according to the knowne and Established Laws
45. JOHN CHILDS, THE BRITISH ARMY OF WILLIAM III, 1689-1702, at 112–15 (1987).
46. See Russell F. Weigley, The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical
Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-
MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 215, 219 (Peter D. Feaver &
Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001); Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution
and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 919, 924 (1988).
47. RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783–1802, at 2 (1975).
48. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). In Loving, the Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy, noted:
Mindful of the historical dangers of autocratic military justice and of the
limits Parliament set on the peacetime jurisdiction of courts-martial
over capital crimes in the first Mutiny Act, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 5 (1689),
and having experienced the military excesses of the Crown in colonial
America, the Framers harbored a deep distrust of executive military
power and military tribunals.
Id. at 760.
49. See, e.g., J. MARCH, AN ARGUMENT OR, DEBATE IN LAW: OF THE GREAT QUESTION
CONCERNING THE MILITIA; AS IT IS NOW SETTLED BY ORDINANCE OF BOTH THE
HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT (London, Pain & Simmons 1642); see also JANELLE
GREENBERG, THE RADICAL FACE OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: ST. EDWARD’S
“LAWS” IN EARLY MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 200–03 (2001) (describing the de-
bate over who controlled the militia in 1640’s England).
50. 1 Will. & Mary, sess.2, c.2 (1689); see F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF ENGLAND: A COURSE OF LECTURES DELIVERED 328 (2001).
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of this Realme.”51 In 1698, John Trenchard—a well-known political
writer, or “pamphleteer” of the late seventeenth century—warned
that where there is a standing army, “the King is perpetual General,
may model the Army as he pleases, and will be called High-Treason to
oppose him.”52 Trenchard also argued that a sovereign’s use of stand-
ing armies could lead to the destruction of a constitution.53
In the rebelling colonies that became the United States, George
III’s use of a standing army (with the addition of Hessian merce-
naries) was bitterly resented and is listed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence’s grievances.54 Shortly after arriving as ambassador to
France, Thomas Jefferson made his belief known that standing armies
were antithetical to the new republic.55 Likewise, Delegate Edmund
Randolph noted at the Virginia ratifying convention that “there was
not a member in the federal Convention, who did not feel indignation”
at the idea of a standing army.56 And, James Madison argued in the
Federalist Papers:
The liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and
that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few excep-
tions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, there-
fore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision.
On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its con-
sequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection
and precaution.57
It is true that, over time, the standing army fears have dissipated.
In 1951, political scientist Clinton Rossiter posited that had the fram-
ers foreseen the need of an enlarged army during the twentieth cen-
tury and the largely responsible conduct of its commanders, they
51. Mutiny Act 1689, 1 Will. & Mary, ch. 5. The act, however, decreed swift and capi-
tal punishment for mutinies and desertions. Id.
52. JOHN TRENCHARD, AN ARGUMENT SHEWING, THAT A STANDING ARMY IS INCONSIS-
TENT WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT, AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE ENGLISH MONARCHY 14 (London 1698). The radical Whigs, among
them John Trenchard, are remembered today as rigid defenders of personal liber-
ties in the face of Britain’s increasingly powerful fiscal-military state. See Adam
Lebovitz, An Economy of Violence, Financial Crisis and Whig Constitutional
Thought, 1720-1721, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 165, 168–69 (2017).
53. TRENCHARD, supra note 52, at 11.
54. See, e.g., David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
447, 517 (2008).
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in THOMAS JEF-
FERSON: WRITINGS 914 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); see also Frederick Bernays
Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1958) (discussing Jefferson’s desire to have a bill of rights as a mode
of defense from the dangers of a standing army).
56. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 401 (2d ed. 1901).
57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 262 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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would have determined that their fears were groundless.58 This is not
to state that Rossiter lightly dismissed the possibility that the United
States could devolve into a dictatorship; in fact, in 1948, he warned
that this could become a possibility.59
Although the Court has recognized the importance of the framers’
standing army fears, the federal judiciary historically absented itself
from applying common rights to appeals against military acts. For in-
stance, in Orloff v. Willoughby, the Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Robert Jackson, concluded that “judges are not given the task
of running the Army.”60 Orloff arose from a medical doctor’s challenge
to being drafted into the army as an enlisted soldier after the Air
Force initially determined him to be unfit for a commission because of
his alleged ties to communism.61 A further oddity to Orloff was that
the Senate, in its hearings on a peacetime draft, assured the American
Medical Association that doctors would only be drafted to serve as doc-
tors, who by their status, had to be commissioned officers.62 In 1958,
the Court in Harmon v. Brucker, a short per curiam decision, held that
the military, like the federal government, had an obligation to follow
its own regulations.63 Harmon and another service member were dis-
charged with less than honorable discharges solely on the basis that
they had attended meetings of leftist organizations on the Attorney
General’s Subversive Organizations List prior to their service.64 Har-
mon only modified Orloff in that the Court did not find the regulation
offensive to due process, but rather, in a de facto manner, adopted Ser-
vice v. Dulles, a decision which required the State Department to com-
ply with its own regulations regarding security clearances and the
removal of employees.
Thus, even with the existence of Harmon, Orloff has remained in-
fluential in military law. In the 1981 case Rostker v. Goldberg, in re-
gard to the training and control of military forces, the Court observed,
“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in
which the courts have less competence.”65 The Court earlier applied
this same abstention jurisprudence to the performance of the Ohio Na-
58. CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 102
(1951).
59. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 288–314 (1948).
60. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953).
61. See, e.g., JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG & ERIC MERRIAM, IN A TIME OF TOTAL WAR: THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 201–06 (2016).
62. See Orloff, 345 U.S. at 84.
63. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
64. JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, SHAPING U.S. MILITARY LAW: GOVERNING A CONSTITU-
TIONAL MILITARY 13–15 (2014).
65. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65–66 (1981) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413
U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
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tional Guard following the Kent State shootings fifty years ago.66 Fi-
nally, federal courts have also determined that neither the
Insurrection Act of 1807 nor the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 provide
judicial avenues for recourse against the executive branch.67 Thus,
when President Trump acted with the threat to use the military in
response to the nation-wide demonstrations for racial justice, however
in contravention his conduct was to the framers’ standing army fears,
federal court intervention was unlikely.
B. George Van Horn Moseley: A Forgotten Extreme in Civil-
Military Relations
Perhaps the most disturbing example of a retired general who tried
to upend the Republic is that of Major General George Van Horn
Moseley, a one-time Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army (the second
ranking general at the time). On February 22, 1942, George E.
Deatherage, the former “commander” of the Knights of the White Ca-
mellia, informed a congressional investigation that his organization
sought to create a fascist government in the United States with Mose-
ley as the leader.68 A civil-military relations scholar need not guess
what Moseley intended because he left his correspondences to the Li-
brary of Congress, Manuscripts Division. There are dozens of letters
in which he claims that Jews and non-whites posed a threat to civili-
zation.69 However, one letter in particular evidences Moseley’s knowl-
66. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11–12.
67. On the Insurrection Act and the political question doctrine, see Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. 1 (1849). On the non-justiciability of domestic military surveillance, see
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). On violations of the Posse Comitatus Act not
providing a suppression remedy in criminal trials, see Bissonette v. Haig, 776
F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1985).
68. Admitted Nazi Contacts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1942, at 1.
69. See, e.g., Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Edward Har-
ding (Mar. 3, 1945) (on file with the Library of Congress); Letter from Gen.
George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Tiffany Blake, Editorial Writer, Chi.
Tribune (Mar. 30, 1939) (on file with the Library of Congress). Moseley penned to
Blake, the Tribune’s chief editor, “[i]nvestigations that I have made in New York
and in many other cities, proved to me very conclusively that the Jew is pressing
Communism.” Id. In the same letter, Moseley disclaimed that he was a fascist. Id.
Moseley wrote the letter in response to Blake’s challenge that “I know of no im-
portations from the old country which are more inconsistent with fundamental
American principles, and few more hurtful to American welfare, than anti-semi-
tism.” Letter from Tiffany Blake, Editorial Writer, Chi. Tribune, to Gen. George
Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army (Mar. 28, 1939) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress); see also Letter from James S. Kemper, President, Chamber of Commerce
of the United States, to Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army (May 10,
1940) (on file with the Library of Congress) (responding to Moseley’s concerns);
Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Joseph V. Connolly,
Int’l News Serv. (June 13, 1939) (on file with the Library of Congress) (expressing
Moseley’s view that communism was under “Jewish control” and explaining how
he believed Jewish people to be linked to communism).
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edge of the continuation of military jurisdiction over him with the
concluding statement: “The only good I can do now is in keeping up
quite a large correspondence with men who are in a position to influ-
ence public affairs. The enemy has completely silenced me, and I am
handicapped, as I am still a Government official, in fact.”70 Despite his
understanding of the Army’s continuous jurisdiction, he also believed
he could publicly campaign against President Roosevelt, the New
Deal, Jews, and civil rights.
In 1939, Moseley tried to have General Walter Delamater, the com-
mander of the New York National Guard, expel Jewish officers from
the Guard.71 That same year, a small fascist organization, the Ameri-
can Christian Front Conference, sought Moseley to become a “fuhrer
for the United States” just as Adolph Hitler had garnered the title in
Germany.72 In April, 1940, the United States Attorney for the South-
ern District of New York prosecuted a captain named John T. Prout
for sedition against the United States Government.73 Prout, like
Moseley, was connected with the American Christian Front, and there
was evidence that Moseley at least knew of Prout’s involvement.74
Likewise, in 1944, the movement’s leader, William Pelley, was prose-
cuted for sedition against the government at the behest of Nazi Ger-
many.75 When the Federal Bureau of Investigations searched Pelley’s
property, they found correspondence between Pelley and Moseley to
“change the course of American history.”76
On June 4, 1939, the New York Times, along with other major
newspapers, reported that the Judge Advocate General of the Army
was in the process of investigating the recently retired Moseley for the
purpose of advising Secretary of War Harry Woodring whether to con-
duct a court-martial.77 The Articles of War—the predecessor to the
modern Uniform Code of Military Justice—criminalized “all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,
[and] all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military ser-
70. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to James Scott Kemper,
President, Chamber of Commerce of the United States (Dec. 28, 1940) (on file
with the Library of Congress).
71. See Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Gen. Walter A.
Delamater, N.Y. Nat’l Guard (Apr. 21, 1939) (on file with the Library of
Congress).
72. GLEN JEANSONNE, WOMEN OF THE FAR RIGHT: THE MOTHERS’ MOVEMENT AND
WORLD WAR II 40 (1996).
73. Bishop Is Called ‘Paid Alien Agent’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1940, at 10.
74. Pelley Is Pictured in Plot for Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1944, at 6.
75. Charge Pelley Planned a Coup to Seize Power, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1944.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Moseley Inquiry Started by Army; Judge Advocate General Will Decide if
There Are Grounds for Court Martial, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1939, at 39; Moseley
Court-martial Asked of War Office, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1939, at 5.
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vice,” and this prohibition applied to retired soldiers.78 Less than a
year earlier, Woodring accused Moseley of disloyalty to the United
States after Moseley warned, in a public speech, that the federal gov-
ernment’s expansion of authority under President Franklin Roosevelt
would lead to a dictatorship.79 The Washington Post, New York Times,
Chicago Tribune, and other major newspapers reported on Moseley’s
conduct.80 And, it appeared that prominent generals remaining in the
Army supported Moseley against Woodring.81
Moseley was not merely an outspoken critic of the New Deal, he
was a virulent anti-Semite and had openly accused Roosevelt of being
a communist.82 The threat of an investigation did not, apparently, de-
ter him, as evidenced by his public excoriation of Roosevelt nominat-
ing Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court. “Nothing could so
encourage the enemies within our gates as this proposed appoint-
ment,” the Atlanta Constitution quoted him. “Nothing could demon-
strate more clearly the President’s opinion of the work of the Dies
committee [the predecessor of the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee] as the appointment of a man whom our subversive elements
look up to as their protector.”83 Moseley was not alone in the military
hierarchy in his assessment of Frankfurter. In 1954, Douglas MacAr-
thur, in his retirement, claimed to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
78. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759, 806–07 (repealed 1948); see also Freder-
ick Bernays Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague?,
54 A.B.A. J. 357, 357–58 (1968) (discussing the legislative history of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice). The Articles of War, at that time, only applied to the
Army and the National Guard when called into active service. Leider, supra note
43, at 1040–41. The Naval Articles applied to the Navy and Marine Corps. See,
e.g., A.A. HARWOOD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL 7–10 (New
York, D. Van Nostrand 1867); WINTHROP, supra note 26, at 31–37.
79. Woodring Hit Moseley Political Talk as Disloyal: General, 64, Retires, Fears Dic-
tatorship, Sees ‘Sinister Motive,’ Army Regrets Words, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1938.
80. See, e.g., D.C. Army Men Feel Moseley Made Mistake: Criticized New Deal, Re-
buked by Woodring, Other Cases Recalled, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1938; Excited
Moseley Tells of Fears: Talks of ‘Warnings’ from Friends; Statement Is Stricken
from Record, ATLANTA CONST., June 2, 1939, at 1; Gen. Moseley Warns of Dictator
Peril: Draws Rebuke from Sec’y Woodring, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1938; Moseley At-
tacks Rearming, Urges Political Coalition, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1938, at X3; War
Department Scanning Activities of Gen. Moseley: But Army Denies It Has
Launched and Independent Inquiry, WASH. POST, May 27, 1939, at 7.
81. See, e.g., JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, THE JEWISH THREAT: ANTI-SEMITIC POLITICS OF
THE U.S. ARMY 252–54 (2000).
82. See, e.g., 2 Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution
471–72 (Richard S. Levy ed., 2005).
83. General Moseley Bitterly Assails ‘Menace’ of Frankfurter Influence: Says Germany
No Problem ‘Compared to Dangerous Trend’ Portended by Appointment to Su-
preme Court of Harvard Law Dean, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 7, 1939, at 2.
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tions Director, J. Edgar Hoover, that Justice Frankfurter was a
leading subversive.84
The activity that led to the Army’s investigation of Moseley began
with his open advocacy, at a Deutsch-American Bund rally, that an
international Jewish conspiracy was attempting a communist take-
over of the United States.85 The Bund was the leading pro-Nazi organ-
ization in the United States, and Moseley insisted that Jews sought
the ruin of democracy.86 By calling Moseley to testify and assuring
him he was not under investigation, Congress delayed, if not pre-
empted, a court-martial in a manner such as that which benefitted
retired Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North a half century later.87 During
his testimony, Moseley was accompanied by Congressman Jacob
Thorkelson (R-MT), a one term congressman remembered for his op-
position to the New Deal and his anti-Semitic defense of Nazi Ger-
many.88 Moseley claimed to the House that the Roosevelt
Administration intentionally ignored the dangers of communism, and
he called the Deutsch-American Bund “impressively patriotic,” while
insisting that the Army should be used to fight communist groups in-
side of the United States rather than posture for a war against Ger-
many or Japan.89 After Moseley testified, Congressman Joseph
Starnes (D-AL) penned his thanks to Moseley, adding “when you at-
tempt to expose un-American and Subversive activities you incur bit-
ter and unscrupulous enemies. Enemies of the Government are also
84. ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND
THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1992).
85. Turn Army on Communists, Moseley Says, Defending Bund: Calls N.Y. Rally ‘Im-
pressive;’ Laments Roosevelt Attitude, WASH. POST, June 1, 1939, at 1.
86. SANDER A. DIAMOND, THE NAZI MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1924–1941, at
223–51 (1974).
87. Moseley Proposes Use of the Army to Drive Out Reds: Tells Dies Committee Men-
ace Could Be Handled in Five Minutes from White House, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
1939, at 1. On North, see United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
North was convicted in the United States District Court after testifying before
Congress under a grant of congressional immunity, but, because the prosecutor
could not, or did not, prove that the prosecution’s witnesses were untainted by
the congressional testimony, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to exclude witnesses who had testified before Congress. United States
v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also R.S. Ghio, Note, The Iran-
Contra Prosecutions and the Failure of Use Immunity, 45 STAN. L. REV. 229,
247–50 (1992) (discussing the use of immunity during the Iran-Contra investiga-
tions in the late 1980s).
88. On Thorkelson, see MARC C. JOHNSON, POLITICAL HELL-RAISER: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF SENATOR BURTON K. WHEELER OF MONTANA 228 (2019). See also Moseley
Depicts a ‘World Jewry’, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1939, at 8 (describing Moseley’s tes-
timony in front of the Dies Committee).
89. Moseley Lauds Bund and Charges Red Plot to Overthrow United States, L.A.
TIMES, June 1, 1939, at 1.
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enemies of those who defend it.”90 Although Moseley had congres-
sional allies, when the committee investigated his claims it deter-
mined his warnings were not only far-fetched, but deplorable and
expunged some of his comments from the record.91
Moseley’s first correspondence to a president over a political mat-
ter occurred in 1931 when he was still on active duty. He promised his
support to former President Calvin Coolidge for the enactment of a
constitutional amendment which would prohibit the government from
going into debt.92 Moseley, like Coolidge, opposed the fulfillment of
the post-World War I bonus promise, both in an accelerated payment
to alleviate misery caused by the Great Depression’s high unemploy-
ment and on its scheduled release.93 To this end, he became associ-
ated with the National Economy League.94 The Economy League was,
in the words of one scholar, “an organization of prominent financiers
and business leaders who denounced the Bonus and called for dra-
matic reductions in veteran benefits.”95
90. Letter from Congressman Joseph Starnes, House of Representatives, to Gen.
George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army (Feb. 13, 1940) (on file with the Library of
Congress). Like Thorkelson, Starnes supported segregation and argued that civil
rights and communism were linked. See, e.g., MICHAEL NEWTON, WHITE ROBES
AND BURNING CROSSES: A HISTORY OF KU KLUX KLAN FROM 1866, at 87 (2014);
GEORGE SIRGIOVANNI, AN UNDERCURRENT OF SUSPICION: ANTI-COMMUNISM IN
AMERICA DURING WORLD WAR II 47 (1990).
91. Dies Inquiry Strikes Out Moseley Text: General Is Permitted to Read Statement
Then It’s Dropped, WASH. POST, June 2, 1939, at 1; see also JEANSONNE, supra
note 72, at 40 (describing the racism of Moseley’s testimony and how it was
scrubbed from the Congressional record).
92. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Calvin Coolidge, for-
mer President, U.S. (Mar. 14, 1931) (on file with the Library of Congress). Mose-
ley professed his admiration for “the stand you take on public questions, national
and international.” Id. In 1932, Moseley joined the National Economy League in
an effort to have the Constitution be amended with a prohibition against spend-
ing monies on non-defense matters unless the available tax dollars were immedi-
ately available. See Letter from Grenville Clark to Gen. George Van Horn
Moseley, U.S. Army (July 14, 1932) (on file with the Library of Congress) (letter
was sent by Mr. Clark’s secretary; enclosed with the letter was a copy of the “Dec-
larations of Purposes and Plan of Organization” for the National Economy
League); Letter from Grenville Clark to Gen. John J. Pershing, U.S. Army (July
13, 1932) (on file with the Library of Congress).
93. See LUCY G. BARBER, MARCHING ON WASHINGTON: THE FORGING OF AN AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRADITION 74–79 (2002). For a history of Moseley’s role in the Army
being used to police and then attack the Bonus March, see James F. Vivian &
Jean H. Vivian, The Bonus March of 1932: The Role of General George Van Horn
Moseley, 51 WIS. MAG. HIST., AUTUMN 1967, at 26–36.
94. See Letter from Grenville Clark to Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army
(July 14, 1932) (on file with the Library of Congress).
95. STEPHEN R. ORTIZ, BEYOND THE BONUS MARCH AND GI BILL: HOW VETERAN POLIT-
ICS SHAPED THE NEW DEAL ERA 57–58 (2010). For news reporting on the National
Economy League, see Plans National Fight on Veterans’ ‘Racket,’ N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1932, at 2.
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Moseley also had a personal relationship with former President
Herbert Hoover, and he shared an editorial he had written against
Woodring with Hoover, disclaiming any anger that he had been
passed over by General Malin Craig for the Army’s top position.96 On
October 1, 1938, Hoover lauded Mosely for being “among those trying
to save the Republic.”97 One year after the United States’ declaration
of war on Japan and Germany, Moseley wrote a lengthy diatribe to
Hoover, accusing Jews and Bolsheviks of starting the world conflagra-
tion and disclaiming that Japan was an enemy of the United States.98
Moseley also evidenced what can be aptly termed as a “white suprem-
acist” view of the United States’ survival, writing: “As far as the white
man is concerned, the index of our ability to even approach a lasting
peace, is in the question of race, and in the progress we are making in
breeding the white race up and eliminating the undesirable
elements.”99
After World War II ended, the aged Moseley continued to try to
dehumanize minorities into non-citizens. In 1946, he wrote to Senator
Tom Connally (D-TX), an anti-civil rights legislator, that “[i]f we in
America now lack the character to face and solve the problem of the
communist and the Jew, then we deserve to go down to defeat, dis-
grace and slavery.”100 That same year he celebrated the election of
Eugene Talmadge, a staunch segregationist, as Georgia’s governor by
penning an editorial that Georgia was a state where “white Christian
Americans still rule.”101 In April 1952, Moseley championed the idea
that a hidden enemy was attempting to take over the nation’s steel
96. Memorandum from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, undated (1938) (on file with
the Library of Congress).
97. Letter from Herbert Hoover, former President, U.S., to Gen. George Van Horn
Moseley, U.S. Army (Oct. 1, 1938) (on file with the Library of Congress).
98. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Herbert Hoover, for-
mer President, U.S. (Dec. 18, 1942) (on file with the Library of Congress). Mose-
ley wrote:
And then, there is the problem of the Jew. No lasting peace can even be
approached until we have the character to stand up to the councils of the
world and solve the recurring problem of the Jew – the Jew who has
been run out of every country in which he has been domiciled. . . . . Mr.
Hitler’s drastic policy of getting rid of the Jews has many more friends
than we are sometimes led to believe.
Id.
99. Id.
100. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Senator Tom Con-
nally, U.S. Senate (Mar. 12, 1946) (on file with the Library of Congress). On Con-
nally’s anti-civil rights efforts, see, e.g., ROBERT D. LOEVY, TO END ALL
SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 156
(1990); PAUL MATZKO, THE RADIO RIGHT: HOW A BAND OF BROADCASTERS TOOK ON
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND BUILT THE MODERN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 56
(2020).
101. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Time Magazine Edito-
rial Board (July 27, 1946) (on file with the Library of Congress).
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corporations.102 This was a direct accusation that President Truman’s
efforts to end a labor strike (through an action that the Supreme
Court, in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, later declared uncon-
stitutional) was, in reality, a Jewish conspiracy.103 In 1956, Moseley
championed the Nuremberg convicted Karl Doenitz to lead the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.104 Doenitz had commanded the Nazi Ger-
man submarine fleet at the start of the war before rising to become
Commander in Chief of the German Navy and served as Fuhrer in the
last week of the Nazi Government’s existence.105 At no time during
the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations was Moseley
brought back onto active duty for the purpose of a court-martial, even
though he actively worked to undermine all three administrations and
basic tenets of the Constitution. Yet he did not only insult presidents,
he advocated causes, including the creation of a fascist government,
which were antithetical to the Constitution.
C. UCMJ Jurisdiction over Retirees and Presidential
Authority to Command Respect
Military jurisdiction over retirees is codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(a)(4)–(6). Unlike a traditional federal pension arising from a
civil service career, military retirement pay is premised on the retiree
being subject to recall to duty in case of a national emergency.106 Sec-
tion 4 enables the Department of Defense to recall retirees from active
duty who are in receipt of pay for the purpose of court-martial or other
military discipline.107 Section 5 enables the extension of military ju-
risdiction to retired reservists who are hospitalized under the medical
care of the armed forces.108 Section 6, which is unique to the Depart-
102. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Harold Keith Thomp-
son, Jr. (Apr. 21, 1952) (on file with the Library of Congress).
103. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). On the steel strike
and accusations of Truman becoming a dictator, see MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND
THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 83–117 (1994).
104. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Karl Doenitz, Grand
Admiral, Ger. Navy (Nov. 19, 1956) (on file with the Library of Congress).
105. EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE TWENTY-
TWO DEFENDANTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG
392 (1966).
106. See, e.g., In re Haynes, 679 F.2d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 1982); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Re-
servists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 356–57 (1964).
107. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4) (2009) reads: “Persons subject to this chapter (a) The follow-
ing persons are subject to this chapter: . . . (4) Retired members of a regular
component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay.”
108. Section 5 reads, “Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hos-
pitalization from an armed force.” Id. § 802(a)(5).
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ment of the Navy, authorizes jurisdiction over members of the Fleet
Reserve and the Fleet Marine Reserve.109
The Court, as well as federal and military appellate courts, have
upheld military jurisdiction over retirees who collect retirement
pay.110 In 1963, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, in Taussig v. McNamara, determined that the military can
place service-related limits on the commercial activities of retirees.111
Taussig, a retired Navy captain, challenged a law which precluded
him from selling services to the Navy because the law—which was
reasonable in relation to active-duty service members—equated retir-
ees to active duty personnel.112 A violation of these limits can, in the-
ory, result in a recall to active duty. However, the limits placed on
retirees may not be arbitrary or capricious. For instance, a retired ser-
vice member who decides to settle in a foreign country but maintains
United States citizenship and does not join a foreign military cannot
be stripped of pay.113
In 1896, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Clos-
son v. United States ex rel Armes, determined that the Army retained
court-martial jurisdiction over an officer who retired in 1883.114 The
retired officer, Captain George A. Armes, a decorated Civil War vet-
eran, had sent an insulting letter to General John M. Schofield shortly
before Schofield’s retirement as Commanding General of the Army.115
This was not the first occasion Armes faced a court-martial and he had
been characterized as “[a]n easily offended and trouble-prone man . . .
the object of numerous courts-martial.”116 In 1889, the New York
109. Section 6 reads, “Members of the Fleet Reserve and the Fleet Marine Corps Re-
serve.” Id. § 802(a)(6).
110. United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, 246 (1881); Costello v. United States, 587
F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979); Abbott v. United
States, 200 Ct. Cl. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973); Ward v.
Charles, 585 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866
(E.D.N.C. 1976); Chambers v. Russell, 192 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Cal. 1961); United
States v. Begani, 79 M.J. 767 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2020); Pearson v. Bloss, 28
M.J. 376 (C.M.A. 1989).
111. Taussig v. McNamara, 219 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Taussig, a retired naval
officer, sought an injunction against the Secretary of Defense and the United
States Attorney General from enforcing a prohibition against him working as an
agent in certain defense contracts. Id. at 758. The district court, in a three-judge
panel, ruled against Taussig. Id. at 762.
112. Id. at 758–59.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353 (1924).
114. Closson v. United States ex rel. Armes, 7 App. D.C. 460, 470–71 (D.C. Cir. 1896).
115. Id.
116. LOUISE K. BARNETT, UNGENTLEMANLY ACTS: THE ARMY’S NOTORIOUS INCEST TRIAL
70 (2000). Armes was, even in his own estimation, a colorful officer. See, e.g.,
GEORGE A. ARMES, UPS AND DOWNS OF AN ARMY OFFICER 588–604 (1900); WAYNE
R. KIME, COLONEL RICHARD IRVING DODGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A CAREER
ARMY OFFICER 493–94 (2006).
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Times reported that Armes was court-martialed for “conduct un-
becoming an officer and a gentleman” after he assaulted the governor
of Pennsylvania during President Benjamin Harrison’s inaugura-
tion.117 Under the headline “A Lucky Officer,” the Times reported that
Armes had been court-martialed in 1868, 1870, and 1879, but Presi-
dents Ulysses Grant, Rutherford Hayes, and James Garfield restored
him to duty each time.118 In 1896, the New York Times and other
newspapers produced several news articles on Armes’s conduct along
with Schofield’s order to have him arrested with the intention of con-
ducting a court-martial.119 In regard to the War Department’s recall
of Armes, the appellate court characterized the arrest and recall as
“not that of a civilian ruthlessly imprisoned by arbitrary military
authority.”120
Only once has the military court-martialed a retired senior officer
for conduct believed to have violated the Articles of War, where the
conduct alleged also occurred after retirement.121 In 1948, the Secre-
tary of the Navy recalled retired Admiral Selden Hooper, a decorated
World War II veteran, to duty based on allegations of conduct un-
becoming an officer and gentleman, conduct of a nature to bring dis-
credit on the armed forces, and sodomy.122 Hooper, who served in the
Navy from 1921 until 1948, was caught in a law enforcement sting
operation targeted against gay men.123 After being found guilty and
sentenced to a dismissal—the officer equivalent of a dishonorable dis-
117. A Lucky Army Officer: The Many Courts-Martial of Capt. George A. Armes, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1889, at 5.
118. Id.
119. Major Armes to Be Re Arrested: The District Court of Appeals Decides that Gen.
Schofield’s Order of Arrest Justified, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1896, at 6; Armes’s Case
an Issue: Discipline of the Army Is Involved in This Affair, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1895, at 3; Captain Armes Arrested, S.F. CALL, Sept. 28, 1895, at 1; The Arrest of
Captain Armes, It May Cause Trouble for Gen. Schofield if the Civil Courts Refuse
to Recognize It as Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1895, at 9.
120. Closson, 7 App. D.C. at 470–71. Armes was never court-martialed by the Army.
See, e.g., The Armes Case, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Jan. 30, 1896, at 3.
121. See JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW
72–74 (1974).
122. Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1958); LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE
GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 27–33 (2015).
123. FADERMAN, supra note 122, at 27–33; see also J. Mackey Ives & Michael David-
son, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Retirees under Articles 2(4) and 2(6): Time to
Lighten Up and Tighten Up?, 175 MIL. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (describing the court-
martial in Hooper). Professor Faderman uncovered that the commanding officer
of the district overseeing Hooper’s court-martial had once before recalled a re-
serve officer to active duty for the purpose of administratively discharging the
retired officer with a less than honorable discharge, though in that instance, it
was for suspected membership in a subversive organization. FADERMAN, supra
note 122, at 33; see also, Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (holding
that the Secretary of the Navy does not have the implied authority to discharge a
retired officer for subversive activities); Bland v. Hartman, 245 F.2d 311 (D.C.
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charge—Hooper spent two decades unsuccessfully trying to argue to
the federal courts that the military did not have jurisdiction over him
because he was retired.124 The nation’s major newspapers covered
Hooper’s court-martial and his appeal efforts.125
10 U.S.C. § 802(4)–(6), along with Closson and Hooper, enables the
military to recall to duty a retired senior officer who publicly delegi-
timizes a presidency for the purpose of court-martialing the officer or
issuing an adverse administrative decision regarding the officer’s sta-
tus. If, in fact, a president, secretary of defense, service secretary, or
other general serving in a convening authority capacity believed that
a retired officer undermined presidential authority over the military,
the accused officer could be brought back onto active duty and disci-
plined either through the court-martial or administrative process.126
Whether by a court-martial or through an adverse administrative de-
cision, an officer faces loss of income, a fine, or loss of retirement and
benefits.127 In either a court-martial or an administrative process, the
UCMJ provides the Commander in Chief with three statutes, in par-
ticular, in which to adjudge the conduct of retired officers accused of
undermining a presidency.
Article 88 of the UCMJ prohibits officers from using contemptuous
language against a president as well as other specified cabinet and
sub-cabinet officials.128 Article 88 carries a maximum sentence of one
year in confinement and a dismissal.129 In 1945, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that an enlisted ser-
Cir. 1957) (holding that the Navy could discharge a retired officer for subversive
activity).
124. See, e.g., Hooper v. Hartman, 274 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1959); Hooper v. United
States, 164 Ct. Cl. 151 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Hooper v. Laird, 41 C.M.R. 329 (C.M.A.
1970).
125. See, e.g., Morals Conviction of Admiral Upheld, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1960, at A9;
Navy Trial Upheld for Retired Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1958, at 8.
126. On the incorporation of UCMJ articles to administratively separate or discipline
service members, see N.G. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 375 (Cl. Ct. 2010).
127. See, e.g., 10 USC § 815 (2006); Piersall v. Winter, 435 F.3d 319 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Fuller v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 640 (Cl. Ct. 2016).
128. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006). The statute provides that:
Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the
President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
or the Governor or legislature of any State, Commonwealth, or posses-
sion in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-mar-
tial may direct.
Id. On the use of Article 88 to administratively terminate an officer’s commission,
see Sharpe v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 805 (Cl. Ct. 2017), aff’d, Sharpe v.
United States, 935 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Although the issue in Sharpe had
to do with backpay and reinstatement, the claims court and the court on subse-
quent appeal did not challenge the validity of removing an officer from the service
who violated Article 88. Id.
129. 10 U.S.C. § 888.
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vice member’s court-martial conviction under the Sixty-Second Article
of War and its commensurate sentence were constitutional.130 Private
Hugh Callan had openly advocated, much in the same manner as had
the retired Moseley, that President Roosevelt was “a dirty politician”
whose war aims were relegated to “safeguarding the wealth of
Jews.”131 While Callan was an enlisted service member and charged
under a different statute than the predecessor to Article 88, the Fifth
Circuit’s decision later became important to upholding the constitu-
tionality of Article 88 against an officer in United States v. Howe.132 In
1967, Lieutenant Henry H. Howe prominently stood outside of the
Fort Bliss Army Base in El Paso, Texas while displaying a sign to the
public which stated “LET’S HAVE MORE THAN A CHOICE BE-
TWEEN PETTY IGNORANT FASCISTS IN 1968,” on one side, and
“END JOHNSON’S FASCIST AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM,” on the
other.133 In Parker v. Levy, the Court, while citing to Howe, upheld
criminalizing officer speech that degraded military readiness and dis-
cipline.134 In addition to Article 88, an officer may be prosecuted for
violating the UCMJ’s prohibition against soliciting mutiny as well as
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.135
130. Sanford v. Callan, 148 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1945). Callan, unlike Moseley, was en-
listed and not subject to the predecessor of UCMJ Article 88. Id.
131. Id. at 376–77. Callan also publicly claimed that Nazi Germany’s and Imperial
Japan’s reasons for waging war against the United States were justified. Id.
132. United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429 (C.M.A. 1967). The Court of Military Ap-
peals noted that a version of Article 88 existed in the British Army at the time of
the Revolution and remained a part of the military law of the United States. Id.
at 437. The court further noted:
The evil which Article 88 of the Uniform Code, supra, seeks to avoid is
the impairment of discipline and the promotion of insubordination by an
officer of the military service in using contemptuous words toward the
Chief of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval
Forces of the United States.
Id. at 437.
133. Id. at 432. For coverage of Lieutenant Howe’s conduct, see ACLU Will Aid Army
War Critic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1966, at 5; Anti-Vietnam Army Officer Loses Ap-
peal: Case Raises Point of Off-Duty Actions by Military Personnel, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 1967, at A1; Army Lieutenant Examined: Carries Poster in Viet Rally, EL
PASO HERALD-POST, Nov. 8, 1965, at 23.
134. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 754 (1974). It should be noted, however, that Cap-
tain Howard Levy was not charged with violating Article 88. See id. at 737–38.
Rather, Levy was convicted, in part, inter alia, for violating Article 133, Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Id. at 738.
135. 10 U.S.C. § 882, titled “Solicitation,” incorporates the solicitation of others to en-
gage in mutiny. 10 U.S.C. § 882 (2006); see, e.g., United States v. Morris, 21
C.M.R. 535 (N.B.R. 1956). 10 U.S.C. § 933 states: “Any commissioned officer, ca-
det, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006).
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III.  GENERALS AND THE QUEST FOR THE PRESIDENCY
Identifying the original purpose of the Whig Party contextualizes
the actions of current retired generals and admirals, as well as any
supposed impact on civil-military relations. According to Professor
Michael F. Holt, in his comprehensive history of the Whig Party, “[t]he
original objective of the Whig Party . . . was to save public liberty . . .
by keeping [President Andrew] Jackson’s hand-picked successor out of
the White House.”136 This also meant removing the political ideology
Jackson brought into government. Jackson’s detractors claimed,
among other criticisms, that he routinely disregarded the law and
posed a threat to the Republic.137 The Whigs failed to accomplish their
goal in 1836 with the election of Jackson’s vice president, Martin Van
Buren, to the presidency, but their loss to Van Buren led to a continu-
ation of vocal anti-Jacksonian policies.138 In 1840, when military hero
and Whig candidate William Henry Harrison campaigned for the pres-
idency, he declared that the government was “in the hands of a monar-
chy,” and under Jackson and Van Buren, the United States had
become “a monarchy in spirit if not in name.”139 That three Whig
presidential candidates had extensive military experience and two—
Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott—were professional soldiers evi-
dences that, even in the pre-Civil War Republic, certain generals were
not universally believed to be threats to liberty, but rather, there was
a belief that the generals were able to govern for the preservation of
the Constitution.
A. The Successful Run: Taylor, Grant, and Eisenhower
Prior to 1952, generals who served as “career” or “professional”
military officers had thrice become president in United States history.
Additionally, three prominent career officers aspired to be president
but lost in the general elections. Each of the six: Zachary Taylor, Win-
field Scott, George McClellan, Ulysses Grant, Winfield Scott Hancock,
and Dwight Eisenhower, spent considerable parts of their pre-political
136. MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN
POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 49 (1999).
137. MARK R. CHEATHEM, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE RISE OF THE DEMOCRATS 245
(2015); EDWARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY, AND POLIT-
ICS 184–87 (1985); MATTHEW WARSHAUER, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE POLITICS OF
MARTIAL LAW: NATIONALISM, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PARTISANSHIP 237–40 (2006).
138. WILENTZ, supra note 27, at 449–54.
139. ELLIS, supra note 33, at 188; see also Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo,
The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 667, 677–78 (2003) (quoting William Henry Harrison for the proposition
that “the Government is now a practical monarchy”). Professors Calabresi and
Yoo point out that Presidents Harrison, John Tyler, Zachary Taylor, and Millard
Fillmore often exercised unitary executive power despite the Whig position to the
contrary. Id. at 697–704.
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lives in the Army and had achieved national acclaim as professional
military officers. All six of the presidential aspirants were the product
of a party process which strove to nominate a candidate who promised
stability or a return to a prior status quo rather than revolutionary
change. Each presents a case-study worthy of a full length book, but
are noted here for the purpose of arguing that if a general (or admiral)
who formally enters into the political arena by running for the nation’s
highest office does not present a threat to civil-military relations, then
remarks of retired senior officers lacking their prior command author-
ity can hardly be said to constitute a threat to the United States or the
place of the military within it.
Zachary Taylor was commissioned a lieutenant (ensign) in the
Army on May 3, 1808.140 He served in the War of 1812, the Black
Hawk War of 1832, the Seminole War (1835–1842), and commanded a
significant military force in Texas during the Mexican-American War
(1846–1848) before becoming the Whig presidential candidate in
1848.141 Since the United States Military Academy was established as
a small institution in 1802, in Taylor’s time most of the Army’s officers
received their commissions through the militia system or by direct ap-
pointment.142 Thus, the fact that Taylor received his commission
without attending the Academy was not unusual.143 During his mili-
tary career, Taylor had not overtly espoused Whig Party positions, but
several of that party’s elites believed his military credentials were
necessary for obtaining the presidency, particularly because of the fac-
tionalism enveloping the country over slavery.144
In selecting Taylor, Whig leaders followed their first successful
quest for the presidency when they nominated William Henry Harri-
son in 1840. Harrison, who served as president between March 4 and
April 4, 1841, was a prominent military figure from the War of 1812,
140. K. JACK BAUER, ZACHARY TAYLOR: SOLIDER, PLANTER, STATESMAN OF THE OLD
SOUTHWEST 5 (1985). Taylor’s commission was a part of the enlargement of the
Army in response to the Chesapeake Affair the prior year. Id. In 1807, the crew of
the H.M.S. Leopard, a British Royal naval ship, attacked and boarded the U.S.
frigate Chesapeake, and, following the American commander’s surrender, British
naval officers removed four sailors from the Chesapeake that they determined
had deserted from the Royal Navy. One of the removed sailors was convicted and
executed. This incident led to the increase in the size of the military and was one
of several underlying causes of the War of 1812 with Britain. See DONALD R.
HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812, at 16–17 (1989).
141. HOLT, supra note 136, at 269–71; DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS,
1848–1861, at 79–81 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976).
142. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF WEST
POINT 24–38 (1966); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FEDER-
ALISM 158–61 (1987).
143. BAUER, supra note 140, at 5–6.
144. 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY,
1776–1854, at 477–92 (1990); HOLT, supra note 136, at 269–70; JOSEPH G.
RAYBACK, FREE SOIL: THE ELECTION OF 1848, at 35–45 (1970).
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but he had long been out of the military, having served as minister to
Gran Columbia, in both houses of Congress, and as the territorial gov-
ernor of Indiana.145 Neither Taylor nor Harrison were roundly viewed
as a danger of usurping democracy.146 Indeed, Whig leaders hoped
Taylor could bring an end to sectionalist fights over slavery without
resorting to what they perceived as Jackson’s disregard for the law
and convention.147 As a sign of his commitment to respect constitu-
tional institutions, Taylor promised to sign the Wilmot Proviso if Con-
gress voted for it.148 Named for its originator, Congressman David
Wilmot (D-PA), the Proviso was a proposed law to prevent the exten-
sion of slavery into any lands conquered from Mexico.149
In 1868, after the Republican Party nominated Ulysses Grant,
Taylor defeated Democrat Party candidate Horatio Seymour by
356,592 votes (or by a margin of 52.7% to 47.3%).150 Four years later,
Grant bested Horace Greeley to earn another term of office.151 Greeley
ran on a liberal Republican platform that sought reconciliation with
the South but also reform in the Republican Party against the spoils
system.152 Grant beat Greeley by a margin of 55.6% to 43.8% of the
popular vote, and Grant notably obtained the support of several for-
mer Confederate officers, including John Singleton Mosby who only
eight years earlier had been considered a war criminal.153 Because
Grant’s elections were the first two after the Civil War and the Union
Army policed the former Confederate states as part of Reconstruction,
the nature of the military’s subordination to the civil government be-
came central to the question of whether Grant would respect the Con-
stitutional subordination of the military to the civil government.154 In
145. On Harrison, see HENDRIK BOORAEM, A CHILD OF THE REVOLUTION: WILLIAM
HENRY HARRISON AND HIS WORLD, 1773–1798, at 1–7 (2012).
146. See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 195 (2009); WILENTZ, supra note
29, at 449.
147. WILENTZ, supra note 29, at 616–17.
148. HOLT, supra note 136, at 345.
149. ROGER L. RANSOM, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAV-
ERY, EMANCIPATION, AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 97–99 (1990). The Proviso did
not become law because pro-slavery Whig and pro-slavery Democrats in the Sen-
ate voted for its removal from a House bill. Id.
150. DEBORAH KALB, GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 310 (2015).
151. ANDREW L. SLAP, THE DOOM OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE LIBERAL REPUBLICANS IN
THE CIVIL WAR ERA 164–65 (2006).
152. MITCHELL SNAY, HORACE GREELEY AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 176–80 (2011); ADAM MAX TUCHINSKY, HOARCE GREELEY’S
NEW-YORK TRIBUNE: CIVIL WAR-ERA SOCIALISM AND THE CRISIS OF FREE LABOR
228–34 (2009).
153. See KALB, supra note 150, at 312; JAMES A. RAMAGE, GRAY GHOST: THE LIFE OF
COL. JOHN SINGLETON MOSBY 333 (1999).
154. See, e.g., GREGORY P. DOWNS, DECLARATIONS OF DEPENDENCE: THE LONG RECON-
STRUCTION OF POPULAR POLITICS IN THE SOUTH, 1861–1908, at 113 (2011).
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spite of his position as the Commanding General of the Army, in 1868
much of the country appeared to accept that Grant did not seek dicta-
torial rule and would respect constitutional norms.155 Given the na-
ture of Grant’s support in 1872, the same conclusion can reasonably be
made.
Grant had been commissioned in 1843, following his graduation
from the United States Military Academy, and had fought in the Mexi-
can-American War. As a result of indebtedness, alcoholism, and per-
sonal misfortune, he left the Army in 1854.156 When the Civil War
began, he obtained a colonelcy and, through a series of successful com-
mands in increasingly bloody battles, was promoted to major gen-
eral.157 After commanding an army at the Battle of Vicksburg and in
Tennessee, President Lincoln promoted Grant to lieutenant general—
a rank not held since George Washington resigned his commission—
as well as to command over all the Union’s armies.158 By war’s end,
Grant was a military hero, at least in the North, and remained apart
from the internecine fights in Congress and the Executive Branch,
which led to the impeachment and Senate trial of President Andrew
Johnson.159
Although as president Grant would exercise extraordinary powers
to defeat the Ku Klux Klan and maintain Reconstruction, he had no
designs to erode the military’s subordination to the civil govern-
ment.160 Indeed, he was reactive rather than proactive to events in
the southern states and sought Congress’s approval to use the Army to
restore order and preserve the newly achieved rights of former
slaves.161 Grant’s “let us have peace” platform was designed to reduce
the possibility of a renewed war, and to that end, he tried to avoid
taking actions that would lead to him being accused of becoming a
despot.162
In 1952, Dwight David Eisenhower achieved the Republican nomi-
nation for the presidency and then won a sweeping victory against his
155. See, e.g., WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869–1879, at 22
(1979).
156. WILLIAM S. MCFEEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY 28–57 (1981).
157. BROOKS D. SIMPSON, ULYSSES S. GRANT: TRIUMPH OVER ADVERSITY, 1822–1865, at
78–83 (2000).
158. JOAN WAUGH, U.S. GRANT: AMERICAN HERO, AMERICAN MYTH 1–3 (2009).
159. See id.; MCFEELEY, supra note 156, at 274–75; BROOKS D. SIMPSON, LET US HAVE
PEACE: ULYSSES S. GRANT AND THE POLITICS OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
203–08 (1991).
160. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUC-
TION 34–35 (2011); JOSIAH BUNTING III, ULYSSES S. GRANT 111–15 (2004).
161. BUNTING III, supra note 160, at 111–15.
162. See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, GRANT 700–07 (2018). Chernow points out that in spite
of Grant’s reticence to use the Army to police the South, in response to doing so,
leading Democrats accused him of despotism. Id.
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Democratic opponent, Governor Adlai Stevenson.163 Eisenhower had
served in the Army from 1915 through his last position as command-
ing general of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military
forces, which ended on May 30, 1952.164 Eisenhower also served as
Columbia University’s president before becoming the commander of
NATO forces, but he retained his military status while at Columbia.
Unlike McClellan, Eisenhower retired from the military before run-
ning for the presidency.165 Moreover, even though Eisenhower had
been assigned as MacArthur’s subordinate earlier in his military ca-
reer, he did not side with MacArthur after Truman removed him from
command.166 As president, Eisenhower’s relationship with the Army’s
senior leadership was strained as he sought to reduce the size of the
nation’s conventional forces (particularly the Army) and have the
threat of “massive retaliation”—an enlarged nuclear arsenal—serve
as a national safeguard against Soviet aggression.167
While Eisenhower’s nomination came on the second ballot of the
Republican Convention in Chicago, it is noteworthy that the recently
retired MacArthur aligned with Senator Robert Taft in an effort to
defeat him.168 MacArthur delivered the convention’s keynote speech,
and while still subject to the UCMJ, excoriated President Harry Tru-
man.169 In ignorance of the notion of an apolitical military, MacAr-
thur insisted that he was “a lifelong Republican.”170 He then accused
the administration of having been “guileless” in negotiations with the
Soviet Union at Yalta, Potsdam, and in other locations; of accumulat-
ing power to the point of a “totalitarian trend”; and permitting mass
corruption.171 While MacArthur’s attacks on Truman could be partly
163. See, e.g., WILLIAM I. HITCHCOCK, THE AGE OF EISENHOWER: AMERICA AND THE
WORLD IN THE 1950S, at 69–83 (2018).
164. SAKI DOCKRILL, EISENHOWER’S NEW-LOOK NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY,
1953–1961, at 17–18 (1996); WILLIAM MCCLENAHAN, JR. & WILLIAM H. BECKER,
EISENHOWER AND THE COLD WAR ECONOMY 1–12 (2011).
165. JOHN ROBERT GREENE, I LIKE IKE: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION of 1952, at 49–51
(2017).
166. SAMUEL WALKER, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM WILSON TO OBAMA: A
STORY OF POOR CUSTODIANS 170 (2012).
167. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE LONG WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 225–26 (2007).
168. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. PEARLMAN, TRUMAN AND MACARTHUR: POLICY, POLITICS, AND
THE HUNGER FOR HONOR AND RENOWN 247–48 (2008); W.H. Lawrence, Taft Fights
to Stop Eisenhower with Coalition in Ballot Today; Platform Wins Without Clash,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1952, at 1; John N. Popham, MacArthur Backers Intensify-
ing Boom: Declare General’s Nomination Would Heal Rifts–Claim Fifth-Ballot
Victory, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1952, at 10.
169. Anne O’Hare McCormick, MacArthur Role Fades: Eisenhower Victory Transforms
Drama of Keynote Speech into Lost Cause Plea, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1952, at 20.
170. Text of MacArthur’s Keynote G.O.P. Convention Speech Assailing Administration,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1952, at 18.
171. Id.
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attributable to the bitterness of being removed from command during
the Korean War, Truman remained his Commander-in-Chief at the
time the speech was delivered.172 At no time was MacArthur formally
admonished by the military for his open denigration of a sitting
president.
As president, Eisenhower reluctantly federalized the Arkansas Na-
tional Guard and placed it under Army command after Governor
Orval Faubus obstructed the rulings of a United States District Court
judge to desegregate the state’s public schools by first using his Na-
tional Guard, in its state status, as a means to do so.173 Eisenhower’s
actions were hardly a step toward despotism as Faubus had not only
defied a district court but did so by using a state National Guard as
the means of defiance.174 Eisenhower’s overall military policy, which
included reducing the size of the Army and other conventional forces
and instead relying on a massive nuclear deterrent, was titled the
“New Look Strategy” and was a step in demilitarizing the country in
the sense that fewer citizens were conscripted into the military.175
The reduction in the size of the Army was not without its critics in the
ranks of generals, but it evidenced to the country that Eisenhower
viewed his role as a constitutional president with limits on his power
to use the military for political ends.176
B. The Unsuccessful Candidates: Scott, McClellan, and
Hancock
Perhaps because the Whigs found success with Harrison and Tay-
lor, in 1852 they turned to Winfield Scott, the Commanding General of
the Army and a veteran of both the War of 1812 and the Mexican-
American War, to be their presidential candidate.177 Although the
Compromise of 1850 was crafted as an attempt at ideological reconcili-
ation by leading Whigs such as Henry Clay, the question of slavery
continuously threatened to undo the Whig Party.178 Leading Whigs
sought to reduce the division between “Cotton Whigs” (northerners
who supported slavery as a part of the national economy) and “Con-
172. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 1016–17 (1992).
173. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 115–18 (2000).
174. See, e.g., ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS
THAT SHOOK THE NATION 136–38 (2007).
175. See, e.g., PETER ROMAN, EISENHOWER AND THE MISSILE GAP 21 (Cornell Univ.
Press ed. 2019).
176. See, e.g., Thomas F. Soapes, A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Eisenhower’s Strategy
for Nuclear Disarmament, in 4 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 57–71 (1980); Gene M. Ly-
ons, The New Civil-Military Relations, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 53, 53–63 (1961).
177. WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852–1865, at
16–18 (1987).
178. See ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 691–95 (1997).
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science Whigs” (abolitionist northerners).179 To this end, Whig elites,
ranging from the abolitionist New York governor William Henry
Seward to the serving President Millard Fillmore, supported Scott’s
candidacy.180 Following Scott’s loss to Franklin Pierce—also a Mexi-
can-American War veteran—he returned to command the Army, ap-
parently presenting no threat to the Republic.181 In fact, Scott did not
retire from the Army until after the Civil War began in 1861.182
Major General George Brinton McClellan, the former commander
of the Army of the Potomac, resigned his commission on November 8,
1864.183 This was the same day that Abraham Lincoln was reelected
president, and McClellan had run as his Democrat opponent.184 Like
Grant, McClellan was a United States Military Academy commis-
sioned officer who served in the Mexican-American War. McClellan
subsequently left the Army to become chief engineer and then vice
president of a railroad before obtaining a commission with the rank of
general when the Civil War began.185 After successive aggravations
with the style and slowness of McClellan, Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton, with Lincoln’s consent, removed him from command over the
Army of the Potomac, the largest force in the Union.186 As a worry
signal of the general’s relationship to the Army, all of the officers in a
Wisconsin regiment tendered their resignations in protest of McClel-
lan’s removal.187
Book-length scholarly studies have examined the poor relationship
between Lincoln and McClellan as well as McClellan’s opposition to
the Emancipation Proclamation, including his promise that if he were
to become president, he would either rescind or ignore it. McClellan,
like many Democrats, believed that Lincoln brought dictatorial de-
signs into the presidency, particularly with the use of the Army to de-
179. See JAMES C. KLOTTER, HENRY CLAY: THE MAN WHO WOULD BE PRESIDENT
365–68 (2018).
180. HOLT, supra note 136, at 728–33; ALLAN PESKIN, WINFIELD SCOTT AND THE PRO-
FESSION OF ARMS 207–09 (2003). It should be noted that Samuel Huntington la-
beled Scott, along with Douglas MacArthur and George B. McClellan, as
“brilliant, imperious, cold dramatic officers deriving their values and behavior
from an older, aristocratic heritage and finding it difficult to subordinate them-
selves to civilian authorities.” HUNTINGTON, supra note 35, at 367.
181. See PESKIN, supra note 180, at 216–19.
182. See DAVID J. EICHER, THE LONGEST NIGHT: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR
130–31 (2001).
183. STEVEN W. SEARS, GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN: THE YOUNG NAPOLEON 385 (1988).
184. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS 664 (2005).
185. CHESTER G. HEARN, LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN AT WAR 19–39 (2012).
186. WILLIAM MARVEL, LINCOLN’S AUTOCRAT: THE LIFE OF EDWIN STANTON 272–83
(2015).
187. STEVEN J. RAMOLD, BARING THE IRON HAND: DISCIPLINE IN THE UNION ARMY 215
(2010).
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stroy slavery.188 Professor Jennifer Weber, in her treatise on the
‘Copperheads,’ noted that Pro-Union Democrats feared that if they
openly opposed the Emancipation Proclamation it would cause a mu-
tiny in the Union Army’s officer corps among McClellan loyalists.189
Although there were fears of a McClellan presidency, it is left to con-
jecture how McClellan would have impacted civil-military relations as
president. That McClellan ran while still in the Army did not defy tra-
dition since Scott and Taylor had already done so. It is difficult to as-
sess the impact his actions caused on civil-military relations since
Lincoln prevailed. Moreover, the post-Civil War Army was rapidly re-
duced in size from almost 500,000 soldiers to 25,000 soldiers by 1872
and was largely removed from the populated centers of the nation.190
The 1864 election was a referendum not only on Lincoln’s adminis-
tration but also over how the southern states might be readmitted to
the Union and whether slavery was to survive as a legal institu-
tion.191 McClellan, ironically, was saddled with a party platform that
considered the war a “failure” and expressed a desire for peace with
the south on less than victor’s terms.192 To be sure, the Civil War im-
periled the United States, and Lincoln had extended military power
over the civilian population in a manner never equaled before or
since.193 Yet, in retrospect, McClellan’s foray into politics was hardly
a threat to the Republic nor did it upend the military’s subservience to
the government. Evidencing this point, the senior officers under Mc-
Clellan’s prior command of the Army of the Potomac, including his
188. See, e.g., BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, ACT OF JUSTICE: LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROC-
LAMATION AND THE LAW OF WAR 126 (2007); JOHN C. WAUGH, LINCOLN AND MC-
CLELLAN: THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN A PRESIDENT AND HIS GENERAL
210–11 (2010); FRANK J. WILLIAMS, ‘Doing Less’ and ‘Doing More’: The President
and the Proclamation—Legally, Militarily, and Politically, in THE EMANCIPATION
PROCLAMATION: THREE VIEWS 48–87 (2006).
189. JENNIFER L. WEBER, COPPERHEADS: THE RISE AND FALL OF LINCOLN’S OPPONENTS
IN THE NORTH 65 (2006).
190. On the Army’s distance from the population between 1866 and 1917, see WILLIAM
ADDLEMAN GANOE, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 298–354 (1924);
HUNTINGTON, supra note 35, at 222–69; DON RICKEY JR., FORTY MILES A DAY ON
BEANS AND HAY 3–18 (1963); ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS: THE UNITED
STATES ARMY AND THE INDIAN, 1866–1891, at 1–11 (1973).
191. See HARRY S. STOUT, UPON THE ALTAR OF THE NATION: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL WAR 388–90 (2006) (discussing the support Lincoln received in the 1864
election from churches and soldiers); WEBER, supra note 189, at 179 (describing
McClellan’s letter for the acceptance of the 1864 Democratic nomination and Mc-
Clellan’s favoring of a “peace by reunion” with the South).
192. WEBER, supra note 189, at 176.
193. See, e.g., JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA
740–47 (1988).
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personal friends, remained loyal to the government, did not overtly
campaign for him, and pursued Lincoln’s war aims.194
Given the size of the Union and Confederate armies during the
Civil War, and the commissioning of lawyers and politicians as gener-
als, it should be little surprise that Republicans and Democrats would
run veteran generals of the war for political office.195 With the excep-
tion of Grant, however, the Republican candidates for the presidency
were not professional soldiers. Rutherford Hayes began the war in the
Union Army with the rank of major and ended the war as a brevet
major general.196 Prior to the war he was a lawyer, and after the war
he served in Congress as well as governor of Ohio.197 Hayes’s eleva-
tion to the presidency occurred following an election which resulted
without a clear winner and a questionable legislative-judicial commis-
sion which bargained his presidency for the end of Reconstruction.198
Likewise, Republican James Garfield was a lawyer and a member of
Congress before his brief presidency.199 As with Hayes, Garfield had
no prior military experience, but, as a result of his leadership, he was
elevated to the rank of general before the war ended.200 As a Republi-
can Congressman, Garfield opposed the radicals in his party and rep-
resented Lambdin Milligan before the Supreme Court.201 Garfield’s
role in Ex Parte Milligan displayed his political ideology of limiting
the military authority of a president over the general population.202
Finally, Benjamin Harrison ended the Civil War as a brevet brigadier
general after serving under General William Tecumseh Sherman.203
Before the war he was a lawyer, and after the war ended, he entered
state politics and was appointed as one of Indiana’s senators.204
194. See, e.g., ZACHARY A. FRY, A REPUBLIC IN THE RANKS: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE
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OF THE POTOMAC 215–18 (2006).
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199. ALLAN PESKIN, GARFIELD 247, 543 (1978).
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309–13 (2012).
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Ironically, when the Democrats selected General Winfield Scott
Hancock as their presidential candidate in 1880, they ran a career sol-
dier who had taken part in the extension of executive branch power to
the degree that in 1865 he refused to comply with a federal judge’s
habeas order to produce Mary Surratt.205 As early as 1864, Hancock
had made it known, while on active duty, that he desired to seek the
presidency, and he was a viable candidate at the 1876 Democrat Con-
vention.206 Hancock was never widely perceived as an antagonist to a
president in the manner that McClellan was, and he was hardly ac-
cused of being a threat to the Union.207 Indeed, the Democrat Party’s
nominating convention in 1880 appears to have selected Hancock for a
reason similar to Taylor’s and Winfield Scott’s selections; namely, that
he could help the party overcome its internal dissensions, much of
which predated the Civil War.208 Having obtained the nomination,
Hancock lost to Garfield in a close election in the popular vote, though
the vote was not close in the Electoral College.209 After his loss, Han-
cock returned to his military command and served out the duration of
his career until he died.210 Based on Hancock’s resumption of com-
mand, it can be surmised that neither Garfield nor President Chester
Arthur considered Hancock a threat to the Republic.
IV.  CASE STUDIES: THE LEX NON SCRIPTA OF CONDUCT
In 1956, a States’ Rights conference was held in Memphis at which
Chief Justice Earl Warren was proclaimed an enemy of the United
States.211 Speakers at the conference insisted that the United States
was in the midst of a “Marxist-Zionist” takeover and that civil rights
equated to communism.212 Among the delegates to the conference
were retired generals Edward M. Almond and Albert C. Wede-
meyer.213 Like George Van Horn Moseley, Wedemeyer was anti-Se-
mitic, and no less than J. Edgar Hoover suspected him of pro-Nazi
205. DAVID M. JORDAN, WINFIELD SCOTT HANCOCK: A SOLDIER’S LIFE 176–81 (1996).
206. See id. at 213–18.
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leanings prior to the United States entry into World War II.214 Wede-
meyer retired in 1951, and shortly after, he claimed that China was
“lost” to the communist-led forces of Mao Zedong because of commu-
nist sympathies within the Truman administration.215 In 1957, Wede-
meyer publicly demanded that President Eisenhower withdraw
recognition of the Soviet Union.216 There is also a connection between
Wedemeyer and Moseley. In 1958, the aged Moseley wrote to Wede-
meyer complaining that President Eisenhower had refused to link the
nation’s Jewish population with the threat of world communist domi-
nation.217 Wedemeyer responded with his agreement that the United
States would likely “be destroyed from within.”218
Like Wedemeyer, Almond was a segregationist who openly opposed
civil rights by linking racial equality advocacy with communism.219
One of the groups present, the National Economic Council—another
far-right organization opposed to civil rights—listed retired general
Charles A. Willoughby and Vice Admiral C.A. Freeman on their board
of directors. Like the others, they linked the idea of racial equality to
communism.220 Willoughby, while still on active duty, went so far as
to undermine the Truman administration by assisting Senator Joe
McCarthy, providing the senator commentary on the state of military
affairs to undermine Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall.221
214. See ROBERT A. ROSENBAUM, WAKING TO DANGER: AMERICANS AND NAZI GERMANY,
1933–1941, at 179 (2010); JONATHAN SCHOENWALD, A TIME FOR CHOOSING: THE
RISE OF MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 27–29 (2001).
215. Wedemeyer Seen Reversing Views, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1951, at 7. In 1947, Secre-
tary of State George C. Marshall sent Wedemeyer to China to advise Chiang Kai-
shek to undertake significant political and military reforms. See WILSON D. MIS-
CAMBLE, GEORGE F. KENNAN AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY, 1947–1950, at
219–22 (1992); ARNOLD A. OFFNER, ANOTHER SUCH VICTORY: PRESIDENT TRUMAN
AND THE COLD WAR, 1945–1953, at 316–18 (2002). Wedemeyer also campaigned
for university systems to terminate the employment of professors who refused to
swear oaths of loyalty or submit to investigations centered on communism on
campuses. See, e.g., Faculty Oustings Urged, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1953, at 25.
216. Sever Diplomatic Ties with Reds—Wedemeyer, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 27, 1957,
at 20.
217. Letter from Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army, to Gen. Albert C. Wede-
meyer, U.S. Army (Nov. 26, 1958) (on file with the Albert Wedemeyer Collection
at the Hoover Institution Archives).
218. Letter from Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S. Army, to Gen. George Van Horn
Moseley, U.S. Army (Dec. 6, 1958) (on file with the Albert Wedemeyer Collection
at the Hoover Institution Archives).
219. MICHAEL E. LYNCH, EDWARD ALMOND AND THE U.S. ARMY: FROM THE 92ND INFAN-
TRY TO THE X CORPS 293–303 (2019).
220. See SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 87 (1995).
221. See Letter from Gen. Charles Willoughby, U.S. Army, to Senator Joe McCarthy,
U.S. Senate (May 25, 1950) (on file in Charles Willoughby Papers at the Gettys-
burg College Special Collections). In this letter, Willoughby alleges that the
“Roosevelt-Truman Machine” was part of a conspiracy that allowed China to fall
2021] THE CRISIS OF JUNE 2020 631
One could add to this list retired General Bonner Fellers, who
headed the Citizens Aid Committee, which, in 1955, declared that any
form of foreign aid was unconstitutional; that the collective defense
requirements of NATO were unfairly greater on the United States;
and that even the British government could not be fully trusted.222
Prior to World War II, Fellers had connections with America First, a
largely anti-Semitic organization devoted to keeping the United
States neutral with the accompanying rhetoric that Jews would bene-
fit from the United States going to war.223 Certainly his attack on
NATO was, either by design or effect, an undermining of Eisenhower’s
presidency. Fellers, like Moseley, Almond, Wedemeyer, and Wil-
loughby, also publicly attacked civil rights.224 There is an irony to Fel-
lers’s criticism of the weakness of NATO because prior to the U.S.
entry into World War II, Fellers was assigned to Egypt as an observer
of the British Army.225 During his tenure,  the United States’ diplo-
matic code was stolen, and Nazi and Italian intelligence operations
obtained and decoded his messages on British troop locations and of-
fensive plans.226 The Nazi command in the Mediterranean dubbed
these messages “little Fellers,” and, for two years, the German Afrika
Korps, under General Erwin Rommel’s command, was able to success-
fully conduct operations against the British, in part, because of Fel-
lers’s carelessness.227
That a small number of prominent retired, or even active duty,
generals and admirals openly provided opinions on political matters
may have been partly caused by the invitation of elected officials, as
well as political alignments between officers and politicians.228 As an
to Mao Zedong’s Communist Party to seize control by defeating Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalist forces. Id.
222. See Letter from Bonner Fellers, Nat’l Dir., For America, to Gen. Curtis LeMay,
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (Nov. 25, 1957) (on file with the Library of
Congress); Bonner Fellers, For America: A Committee for Political Action, Collec-
tive Defense: Strength or Peril? (Nov. 22, 1957) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Library of Congress); Brigadier General Bonner Fellers: Foreign Aid
Wastes Money Needed for National Defense, MANION FORUM (The Manion Forum
Radio Show Wkly., Broadcast No. 360, South Bend, Ind., Aug. 20, 1961) (on file
with the John D. Trevor Papers at the University of Michigan).
223. See BENDERSKY, supra note 81, at 302–04.
224. See, e.g., Willbur H. Baldinger, Ex-Brass and Braid Attack from Right: A Lot of
Brasswork in Rightist Outfits, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1956, at E1; Peter Braestrup,
Now Birch Society Polarizes the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1961, at E10.
225. JOHN W. GORDON, THE OTHER DESERT WAR: BRITISH SPECIAL FORCES IN NORTH
AFRICA, 1940–1943, at 100 (1987).
226. Id.
227. IAN BECKETT, ROMMEL: A REAPPRAISAL 27 (2013); GLYN HARPER, THE BATTLE FOR
NORTH AFRICA: EL ALAMEIN AND THE TURNING POINT FOR WORLD WAR II 24–25
(2017).
228. See, e.g., Isiah Wilson III et al., Kids These Days: Growing Military Professional-
ism Across Generations, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE: STRATEGY,
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example, in early 1993, Air Force General Harold Campbell referred
to President William Jefferson Clinton as a “ ‘pot-smoking,’ ‘woman-
izing,’ and ‘draft dodging’ commander-in-chief.”229 There is a reasona-
ble question as to whether this would have occurred if not for
President George H.W. Bush’s criticisms of Clinton during the 1992
presidential contest.230 In seeking reelection, Bush went so far as to
call Clinton a “draft dodger.”231 Prominent Republicans also criticized
Clinton as a “draft dodger” for his ability to forego military service in
Vietnam through a graduate school exemption, including a Rhodes
scholarship to Oxford University.232 Joining them, the recently re-
tired General Norman Schwarzkopf criticized Clinton’s draft avoid-
ance.233 Not all retirees backed Bush on this point. In contrast to
Schwarzkopf and Campbell, retired Admiral William J. Crowe, a for-
mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed Clinton over
Bush.234 After Clinton was elected to the presidency, conservative
members of Congress, such as Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), gleefully
warned in public forums that soldiers stationed in North Carolina
would not welcome the president because of the absence of his military
record.235
There is a precedential danger in attacking the military record, or
lack of a military record, of political candidates, as doing so tends to
diminish the importance of an apolitical military to the general electo-
rate. However, Bush did not begin the battle over a candidate’s prior
military service during the Vietnam Conflict. In 1988, Democrats
pointed out that vice presidential candidate, and eventual winner,
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 24–25 (Stephen J. Cimbala ed., 2012); PETER D. FEAVER,
ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 182–83
(2003).
229. General Who Ripped Clinton Agrees to Pay Fine, Quit Air Force, CHI. TRIB., June
19, 1993, at L3. Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak reprimanded
and fined Campbell through an administrative process. See also KURT CAMPBELL
& MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY 23–25 (2006) (describing the lack of support for Clinton from members of the
military).
230. See ARNOLD R. ISAACS, VIETNAM SHADOWS: THE WAR, ITS GHOSTS, AND ITS LEGACY
43–45 (1997).
231. Bush Steps Up Attack on Clinton’s ‘Pattern of Deception,’ Draft Record, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1992, at OCA24.
232. ISAACS, supra note 230, at 44.
233. Schwarzkopf Criticizes Clinton on Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at 24.
234. SAM E. SARKESIAN & ROBERT E. CONNOR, THE U.S. MILITARY PROFESSION INTO
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: WAR, PEACE AND POLITICS 66 (2d ed. 2006).
235. Perhaps ironically, Helms invited the newly elected Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Newt Gingrich, to North Carolina where he assured Gingrich of his
state’s welcome. Gingrich had used the same graduate school vehicle to avoid
military service. See, e.g., Howard Kleinberg, Casting Stones About Vietnam,
BALT. SUN (Dec. 2, 1994), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-12-
02-1994336184-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/C2KS-M8NL].
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Daniel Quayle had avoided service in the Vietnam Conflict by using
family connections to join a National Guard unit.236 Although Senator
Robert Dole, the 1996 Republican challenger to Clinton, had served in
World War II and, in fact, was injured in the liberation of France from
Nazi occupation, his running mate Jack Kemp was exempted from ac-
tive duty military service, avoiding being sent to Germany during the
1961 Berlin Crisis because of an injury sustained while playing profes-
sional football.237 Yet, Democrats pointed out that the year after his
exemption he led the San Diego Chargers to a division title as the
quarterback.238 In regards to the 2000 presidential campaign, Vice
President Albert Gore Jr. served in the Vietnam Conflict as a military
journalist while his opponent, George W. Bush, avoided service much
in the same way as Quayle.239 Four years later, Senator John Kerry
(D-MA), who served in combat in Vietnam, lost to Bush and fell victim
to odd attacks over the nature of his Vietnam service.240
The case studies listed below and the conduct of the retired gener-
als and admirals listed at the beginning of this Part are a small sam-
pling of extremes which contributed to the politicization of the
military through the conduct of the officers and politicians. However,
since the United States retains an elected government and other criti-
cal institutions, such as an independent judiciary which issues deci-
sions contrary to presidential actions, it can be deduced that
politically outspoken retired generals have had little effect on perma-
nently damaging the institutions of constitutional government. This is
not to preclude the possibility that each of the individuals caused a
degree of harm to other military norms or that they encouraged
subordinate officers to engage in discreditable or criminal conduct.
A. The Case of General Edwin Anderson Walker
On July 20, 1983, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Harry N. Wal-
ters, restored a pension to former general, Edwin Walker.241 The
Army Board for Correction of Military Records, an administrative
agency within the Department of the Army, recommended that
Walker, a decorated World War II and Korean War veteran, be re-
236. Guy Gugliotta, Was Vietnam a Bad Career Move?, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1993, at
C5.
237. Douglas Frantz, Army Allowed Jack Kemp to Skip Army Call-Up for an Injury,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at 27.
238. Id. On Kemp’s football career, see GERHARD FALK, FOOTBALL AND THE AMERICAN
IDENTITY 9 (2005).
239. See TAI SUNG AN, AMERICA AFTER VIETNAM: FROM ANGUISH TO HEALING 35 (1997);
George Lardner Jr. & Lois Romano, At Height of Vietnam, Graduate Picks Guard,
WASH. POST, July 28, 1999, at A1.
240. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NA-
TIONAL POLICY MAKING 346 (2006).
241. See generally SCHOENWALD, supra note 214, at 100–01.
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stored to his rank and retired.242 Unlike Moseley, Walker was not
technically a retiree, since he had resigned his commission. Because
Walker forfeited his military retirement pay, the military did not pos-
sess jurisdiction over him until Walters acted to restore him. A fervent
anti-communist, Walker tried to submit his resignation from the
Army in 1959, writing “[t]he 5th column conspiracy and influence in
the U.S. minimize or nullify the effectiveness of my ideas and princi-
ples, military mission and objectives, and the necessary American
public spirit to support sons and soldiers.”243 Walker ultimately re-
signed his commission in 1962 after being admonished for attempting
to indoctrinate soldiers with John Birch materials in Germany and
being transferred to a position in the United States.244 His resigna-
tion was partly based on his plans to openly accuse the Kennedy ad-
ministration of fostering communism.245
Walker’s actions, both before and after his resignation, were cov-
ered in the major newspapers, including an accusation that President
Eisenhower had not been strong enough to stop the “dire peril” of com-
munism.246 On July 21, 1962, Walker issued a press release in which
he accused the recently appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Maxwell Taylor, a decorated World War II veteran, of intention-
ally trying to “disarm” the United States’ military forces and place
them under United Nations command.247 Three days later, Walker, in
another press release, once more accused Taylor, but this time in con-
cert with Vice President Lyndon Johnson, of pursuing the loss of Viet-
nam and selling out the military’s junior officers and enlisted
personnel.248 Two months earlier, in a pamphlet, Walker alleged that
242. Codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1552, the Army Board for the Correction of Military
Records, then, as now, recommends to the Secretary of the Army the propriety of
restoring discharged service members to active duty and upgrading less-than-
honorable discharges to honorable, as well as other matters. See, e.g., Dickson v.
Sec’y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
243. Ex Gen Walker Deeply Disturbed by Trends, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1962, at 12.
244. JOSEPH CRESPINO, IN SEARCH OF ANOTHER COUNTRY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE CON-
SERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 57–58 (2007); SCHOENWALD, supra note 214, at
100–01.
245. See, e.g., Letter from Gen. Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, to Senator John Stennis,
U.S. Senate (Dec. 11, 1961) (on file with the Stennis Papers at Mississippi State
University). Walker implored Stennis not to call him “general” and wrote:
I made the decision to give up this title and all the benefits it represents.
Since I did this in order to better serve my country, I believe that it is
most important that your committee and the Congress associate me fully
with the pride I take in being Mr., an American citizen with full rights of
citizenship.
Id.
246. Walker Carries His Crusade to Southland, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1962, at B1.
247. Press Release, Gen. Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army (July 21, 1962) (on file with the
Stennis Papers at Mississippi State University).
248. Press Release, Gen. Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army (July 24, 1962) (on file with the
Stennis Papers at Mississippi State University).
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the Kennedy Administration’s focus on special forces and counter-in-
surgency training was, in fact, not designed to defeat communism in
far-away lands, but rather, for a more sinister preparation: to destroy
anti-communist movements in the United States.249
Prior to his controversial activity in Germany, in 1957, Walker
took command of Arkansas National Guard Forces and, in following
the orders of Eisenhower and Attorney General Herbert Brownell,
oversaw the integration of Little Rock High’s public high schools
against intense segregationist opposition.250 Later, Walker aligned
with pro-segregation movements, believing that the civil rights move-
ment was a communist campaign to undermine the United States.251
Indeed, in 1959, while still on active duty, Walker lobbied Arkansas’s
governor, Orval Faubus, to grant an early release of men convicted of
dynamiting school property.252
On April 16, 1961, Overseas Weekly, a privately published maga-
zine distributed to service members stationed in Europe, reported that
Walker, as a divisional commander, distributed John Birch Society
materials to soldiers under his command.253 A further investigation
uncovered that Walker had accused former President Harry Truman,
former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and former First Lady Elea-
nor Roosevelt of aiding communism.254 Walker also used his com-
mand position to influence soldiers to vote for conservative candidates
in the 1960 elections.255 In doing so, he distributed lists of candidates
produced by Americans for Constitutional Action, a conservative or-
ganization founded by retired Navy Admiral Ben Moreell.256 The New
York Times, along with other news services, headlined Walker’s activi-
249. Edwin A. Walker, What Is Counter-Insurgency? (Am. Eagle Pub. Co., 1962) (on
file with the Stennis Papers at Mississippi State University).
250. HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE PERSISTENCE OF
RACISM IN AMERICA 161 (1998); DAVID A. NICHOLS, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: EISEN-
HOWER AND THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 212–15 (2007).
251. ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS AND ANALYSIS 25–32
(1984).
252. KAREN ANDERSON, LITTLE ROCK: RACE AND RESISTANCE AT CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL
206 (2010). On the trial of one of the defendants convicted for the bombing, see,
Graeme Cope, “The Master Conspirator” and His Henchmen: The KKK and the
Labor Day Bombings of 1959, 76 ARK. HIST. Q. 49, 49–67 (2017). See also Lauder-
dale v. State, 343 S.W.2d 422 (Ark. 1961) (describing the bombing and the case of
one of the defendants).
253. RANDALL BENNETT WOODS, FULBRIGHT: A BIOGRAPHY 287–88 (1995).
254. Id. Walker also accused the leading newsmen of the day, including Walter Cronk-
ite, Eric Sevareid, and Edward R. Murrow, of being “fellow travelers.” Id.
255. Id.
256. See KEN I. KERSCH, CONSERVATIVES AND THE CONSTITUTION: IMAGINING CONSTITU-
TIONAL RESTORATION IN THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 30–31 (2019). Mo-
reell formed the Americans for Constitutional Action for the purpose of electing
more conservatives to Congress. Fact Sheet: Groups Rate Congress, 26 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 915, 916 (1968).
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ties.257 Shortly after Walker’s activities were uncovered by military
investigators, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reprimanded
and removed him from command.258 Secretary of the Army Cyrus
Vance issued a press release informing the public that the Army had
administered an official admonishment to Walker for “taking injudi-
cious actions and for making derogatory public statements about
prominent Americans while in command of the 24th Infantry Divi-
sion.”259 When Congressman Frank Kowalski (D-CT) called for McNa-
mara to remove Walker from command, conservative organizations
accused Kowalski of eroding the Army’s ability to resist
communism.260
In turn, a special Senate subcommittee confronted McNamara and
accused him, as well as President Kennedy, of subverting speech in
the military.261 Prior to the subcommittee meeting, Walker de-
nounced Kennedy for allegedly hiding critical information from the
Senate and because the administration was “soft” on communism.262
Led by conservative, anti-civil rights senators Strom Thurmond (R-
SC) and John Stennis (D-MS), the committee was ostensibly designed
to determine whether the Department of Defense muzzled anti-com-
munist speech.263 In late 1961, however, Walker assisted Stennis in
shaping how the committee would pursue McNamara and others.264
On April 4, 1962, Walker testified that Secretary of State Dean Rusk
257. Russel Baker, Walker Is Rebuked for Linking Public Figures to Communism: Tru-
man and Ms. Roosevelt Were Among Targets of General in Germany, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1961, at 1; Ruckus Settles Down While Army Looks at Charges, SANTA
FE NEW MEXICAN, Apr. 24, 1961.
258. See, e.g., JAMES CLOTFELTER, THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 135 (1973).
259. Press Release, Dep’t of the Army (June 12, 1961) (on file with the Stennis Papers
at Mississippi State University).
260. As Others See It: Kowalski Replies, AMARILLO DAILY NEWS, May 19, 1961.
261. Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies: Hearings Before the
Special Preparedness Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Servs., 87th Cong. 1061
(1962). Present during Walker’s testimony were, in addition to Stennis, Stuart
Symington (D-MO), Henry Jackson (D-WA), Strom Thurmond (R-SC), Robert
Bartlett (D-AK), Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA), and Margaret Chase Smith (R-
ME). Id.
262. Donald Janson, Walker Accuses Kennedy of ‘Gag,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1962, at 10.
263. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., INSIDE A PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 95–98 (2005); Joseph
Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s Sunbelt: Rethinking Regional Politics and the Rise
of the Right, in SUNBELT RISING: THE POLITICS OF SPACE, PLACE, AND REGION
58–81 (Michelle Nickerson & Darren Dochuk eds., 2011).
264. See, e.g., Letter from Gen. Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, to Senator John Stennis,
U.S. Senate (Nov. 13, 1961) (on file with the Stennis Papers at Mississippi State
University); Letter from Gen. Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, to Senator John
Stennis, U.S. Senate (Apr. 2, 1962) (on file with the Stennis Papers at Mississippi
State University); Letter from Gen. Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, to Senator
John Stennis, U.S. Senate (Oct. 6, 1961) (on file with the Stennis Papers at Mis-
sissippi State University). Each of these correspondences indicates that Walker
had communicated his answers well in advance of the hearing.
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and his assistant, Walt Rostow, had created a foreign policy that per-
mitted communism’s global expansion and that there were pro-com-
munist employees in the Department of Defense.265
Shortly after the hearings, Walker returned to Mississippi to help
prevent school integration, particularly the enrollment of James Mer-
edith into the University of Mississippi.266 The Justice Department
determined that Walker’s activities constituted the crimes of inciting
insurrection as well as resisting or impeding United States marshals
in the performance of their duties.267 Walker encouraged white stu-
dents to protest against integration as well as to block federal law en-
forcement from carrying out a judicial order to enable African-
American students to attend the state university.268 Walker’s involve-
ment startled President Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, to the point that they feared he would try to influ-
ence National Guard troops not to follow federal orders to protect the
students.269 Attorney General Kennedy, in turn, ordered Walker ar-
rested and held for psychiatric examination.270 However, Walker was
deemed sane and never prosecuted.271 He did attempt to become
Texas’s governor but finished last in the 1962 Democratic Party pri-
mary.272 Walker later sued the Associated Press, but the Supreme
Court overturned a favorable verdict in 1967.273
Walker, in fact, initiated lawsuits against the media in several
state courts, bringing further national attention to his former service
and post-military conduct.274 The lawsuits also reminded the public
that General Maxwell Taylor condemned Walker and supported Attor-
ney General Kennedy’s decision to charge the general with inciting
265. Walker Rips Rusk’s Cold War Policies, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1962, at 1.
266. CHARLES W. EAGLES, THE PRICE OF DEFIANCE: JAMES MEREDITH AND THE INTEGRA-
TION OF OLE MISS 334 (2009); Walker Urges Resistance Against U.S., L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1962, at 1.
267. U.S. Transfers Gen. Walker to Prison Hospital, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1962, at 1.
268. EAGLES, supra note 266, at 334–35.
269. See EVAN THOMAS, ROBERT KENNEDY 201–02 (2000).
270. Federal Intervention in ‘Ole Miss’ Crisis Takes Shape in Phone Call, WASH. POST,
June 24, 1983, at A12.
271. See SCHOENWALD, supra note 214, at 105–06; Psychiatric Testing Ordered for
Walker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1962, at 1; Walker Wins Freedom in Ole Miss Riot
Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1963, at 1.
272. See Ex General Walker Enters Texas Race for Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1962,
at 1.
273. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
274. See, e.g., Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 368 F.2d 189 (6th
Cir. 1966); Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966).
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insurrection.275 Importantly, Walker also created an environment in
which junior officers believed it was permissible to follow suit.276
In 1962, Major Archibald Roberts, a Walker protégé, spoke to the
Daughters of the American Revolution and accused Assistant Secre-
tary of State G. Mennen Williams of “leftist leanings” and Los Ange-
les’ mayor, Sam Yorty, of being a communist.277 As Michigan’s
governor in the 1950s, Williams pursued one of the more vigorous pro
civil-rights policies in the country and he frequently denounced south-
ern segregationists.278 Prior to Roberts’s speech, Williams proclaimed
a new anti-colonial and anti-apartheid Africa policy with the state-
ment, “[W]hat we want for the Africans is what they want for them-
selves.”279 Anti-civil rights leaders denounced Mennen as a pro-
communist and Kennedy as naı̈ve to support independence move-
ments in Sub-Saharan Africa.280 Still, in 1964, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed Secretary of the Army Cyrus
Vance’s decision to remove Roberts from active duty to the reserves; in
following the guidance in Harmon v. Brucker, Vance had failed to fol-
low governing Army regulations.281 This was therefore a continuation
of Orloff v. Willoughby’s influence because the appellate court specifi-
cally avoided comment on whether the First Amendment’s protections
shielded Roberts’s speech from the loss of position or a clearance; the
decision in Roberts simply focused on whether the military had fol-
lowed procedure.282
275. Anthony Lewis, Mississippi Aides Blamed by U.S. Officials for Riot, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1962, at 1; Walker Seized at Roadblock, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 1, 1962;
Walker to Be Examined at Medical Center, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Oct. 2, 1962.
276. See, e.g., Roberts v. Vance, 343 F.2d 236, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In this instance,
Major Roberts had served on Walker’s staff, and, after Walker resigned from the
Army, Roberts circulated literature claiming that communists in the Pentagon
attempted to libel Walker. The Secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance, ordered Rob-
erts administratively discharged but failed to follow the Army’s internal regula-
tions in doing so. Id. at 239–40.
277. Jack Raymond, Army Is Ordered to Reinstate Major Allied with Gen. Walker;
Court Invalidates Dismissal of Roberts for Forbidden Speech to D.A.R. in 1962,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1964, at 11.
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279. HELEN W. BERTHELOT, WIN SOME, LOSE SOME: G. MENNEN WILLIAMS AND THE
NEW DEMOCRATS 215 (1995).
280. See, e.g., PETER SCHWAB, DESIGNING WEST AFRICA: PRELUDE TO 21ST-CENTURY CA-
LAMITY 1–3 (2004); W.H. Lawrence, President Backs Williams on ‘Africa for Afri-
cans,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1961, at 1.
281. Roberts, 343 F.2d. at 240.
282. Id. The appellate court, in a decision authored by Judge David Bazelon and with
future Chief Justice Warren Burger in concurrence, did not specifically cite to
Harmon. Rather, the court cited to Vitarelli v. Seaton and Service v. Dulles, which
formed the basis for Harmon. Id.
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In the 1970s, Walker was twice arrested and convicted for solicit-
ing male prostitutes.283 The nation’s major news sources reported
when the Reagan administration restored Walker to rank and retire-
ment, but missing from their reporting was an analysis on how the
restoration might affect civil-military relations.284 Ironically, also
missing from the reporting was that Reagan—who had the backing of
religious conservatives opposed to homosexuality—restored a general
to rank that had been twice convicted for same-sex lewdness, while
Selden Hooper, who had not challenged the legitimacy of any presi-
dent, had died without being accorded a similar dignity.285
B. In the Shadow of Smedley Butler: Generals Shoup,
Gavin, and Ridgway
On October 1, 1931, General Smedley D. Butler retired from the
United States Marine Corps.286 He was commissioned into the Corps
in 1898 and served in the Spanish American War, the Philippine In-
surrection, the Boxer Rebellion, in Central America, and in Vera-
cruz.287 In the 1920s, while still on active duty, he was detached to
serve as Philadelphia’s public safety director and tried to enforce pro-
hibition.288 During Bulter’s lengthy military service, he was awarded
two Medals of Honor, but President Herbert Hoover threatened him
with a court-martial.289 Toward the end of his career, Butler publicly
repeated a story that the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, had killed
a child in an automobile accident.290 Hoover ordered Butler to retract
his statement and apologize to Mussolini or face a court-martial.291
Butler retracted his statement, and, although much of the public sup-
ported him over Hoover, it effectively ended his career.292 After his
retirement, Butler unsuccessfully ran for the Senate in Pennsylvania.
283. Ex-Gen. Walker Arrested Again, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1977, at A7; General
Walker Faces Sex Charge: Right-Wing Figure Accused in Dallas of Lewdness, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1976, at 84.
284. See Warren Weaver Jr., Pension Restored for Gen. Walker: Army Board Rein-
states Rank Two Decades After He Quit in Political Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 1983, at 17; Army Restores Pension to Controversial General: Walker Had For-
feited Rights by Resigning After Being Admonished in 1961, L.A. TIMES, July 23,
1983, at A16.
285. On the Reagan Administration and homosexuality, see JEAN HARDISTY: MOBILIZ-
ING RESENTMENT: CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE FROM THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY TO
THE PROMISE KEEPERS 100 (1999).
286. See generally MARK STRECKER, SMEDLEY D. BUTLER, USMC: A BIOGRAPHY 3–16
(2011).
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He may be best remembered for his claim that a cabal of businessmen
had plotted to overthrow President Franklin Roosevelt and his testi-
mony as such to a House investigation.293 In 1935, he published War
Is a Racket, a short book damning war profiteering and the greed of
industrialists and bankers at the expense of common service men.294
While a lengthy study could be accomplished on Butler alone, it suf-
fices to observe that he attempted to preserve a government rather
than delegitimize a president. During the height of the Vietnam War,
another retired Marine general followed Butler’s example and, along
with two decorated retired Army generals, campaigned against the
United States involvement in the war, without attempting to cause a
presidential change.295
On April 21, 1970, General David Shoup, a retired United States
Marine Corps commandant, testified at an enlisted sailor’s court-mar-
tial.296 In World War II, Shoup earned the Medal of Honor for heroism
at the Battle of Tarawa. The Navy charged Roger Priest with inciting
desertion, urging insubordination and disloyalty, and a general charge
of disorder “to prejudice of good order and discipline in the military.”
Priest circulated an underground newspaper which encouraged ser-
vice members to desert to Canada and was highly critical of the gov-
ernment.297 Surprisingly, Priest was assigned to the Pentagon, and he
printed articles defaming the White House as well as comic characters
reflecting President Richard Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, and Federal Bureau of Investigations Director J. Edgar Hoover
as “pigs shitting on the country.”298 News agencies across the United
States contained stories about Shoup’s defense of Priest.299 Shoup’s
testimony may have been helpful as the court-martial only convicted
Priest of the two least egregious charges.300 The court-martial sen-
tenced Priest to no jail time, though the sentence included a bad con-
duct discharge.301 Perhaps, in retrospect, it appears odd that a Medal
of Honor recipient, who rose to the highest rank in the Marine Corps,
293. See, e.g., Gen. Butler Bares ‘Fascist Plot’ to Seize Government by Force, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1934, at 1; Plot U.S. Coup: Gen. Butler: Ex-Marine Head ‘Reveals’
Wild Fascist Plan: ‘Ridiculous’ Say Men Named, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 21, 1934,
at 1.
294. SMEDLEY D. BUTLER, WAR IS A RACKET (1935).
295. See DAVID MILNE, AMERICA’S RASPUTIN: WALT ROSTOW AND THE VIETNAM WAR 210
(2008).
296. Ex-Marine Chief Appears as Witness for Sailor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1970, at 17.
297. Priest v. Sec’y of the Navy, 570 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
298. Id. For a more graphic description of Priest’s conduct, see JOSHUA E. KAS-
TENBERG, supra note 64, at 95–97.
299. See, e.g., Anti-War Seaman Cleared on Appeal, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1971, at B1;
Sanford J. Ungar, Gen. Shoup Will Testify for Priest, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1970,
at C1; The Strange Case of General Shoup, ABILENE REP. NEWS, Apr. 30, 1970.
300. United States v. Priest, 44 C.M.R. 118 (C.M.A. 1971).
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came to the aid of a sailor who denigrated the Commander-in-Chief,
but Shoup had already been outspoken against the United States in-
volvement in the Vietnam Conflict.302
On May 1, 1966, Shoup—two years removed from his date of re-
tirement—spoke to a crowded college-aged audience in Los Angeles
and insisted, “I don’t think the whole of Southeast Asia, as related to
the present and future safety and freedom of the people of this coun-
try, is worth the life or limb of a single American.”303 Perhaps presag-
ing Powell et al., Shoup also addressed racial inequality lamenting the
reality that “ ‘created equal’ means equal at birth and death” and at-
tacked the prevailing historic narrative with the observation: “You are
taught that Columbus was the first to discover America which is as
false as my grandmother’s teeth.”304 Shoup’s anti-war activities gar-
nered congressional attention. In 1967, Congressman William Ryan
(D-NY) interviewed Shoup on a radio program to have the general’s
criticisms of President Johnson’s Vietnam policies aired to
constituents.305
Unlike Moseley and Walker, Shoup insisted that the military’s
subordination to the civil government was paramount, but he also in-
sisted that negotiating with Ho Chi Minh was the only viable means
to secure South Vietnam’s security.306 Shoup also stressed that one of
the reasons for domestic social discord was that the youth of the
United States had experienced bigotry and been taught a historic nar-
rative based on lies, similar to President Lyndon Johnson’s broken
promise of not escalating the war.307 On March 20, 1969, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee called Shoup to testify that, in his opin-
ion, the United States’ security interests were not at stake in South
Vietnam.308 Two years after his interview with Ryan, and one year
prior to his testimony on behalf of Priest, Senator George McGovern
302. Bob Buzzanco, The American Military’s Rationale Against the Vietnam War, 101
POL. SCI. Q. 559, 561 (1986); Howard Jablon, General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.:
Warrior and War Protester, 60 J. MIL. HIST. 513, 531–33 (1996).
303. 113 CONG. REC. 3974 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hartke).
304. Id. at 3975
305. Interview Transcript, Congressman William F. Ryan, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, News from Congressman William F. Ryan: Recorded Interview Between
Congressman Ryan and Gen. David Shoup, (Dec. 19, 1967) (on file with the David
Shoup Collection at the Hoover Institution Archives).
306. Shoup Says U.S. Can’t Win in South Vietnam, TUCSON DAILY CITIZEN, Mar. 20,
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90th Cong. 1 (1968); John W. Finneyspecial, 139 in House Support Drive for a
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(D-SD) asked Shoup to proofread an antiwar speech he intended to
give in the Senate.309 In 1972, McGovern was the Democrat candidate
for president.310
Shoup was by no means the only retired general to criticize the
United States’ involvement in the war. During the late 1960s, General
James Gavin warned that the growing income gulf between wealthy
and poor Americans, as well as the seemingly unending Vietnam Con-
flict, had put the United States in danger.311 Beginning in 1965,
Gavin publicly warned that the escalation of force in Vietnam would
cause more harm than good, and the following year, he testified to this
opinion before a televised Senate investigation.312 Two years later, he
announced to the public, in a book titled Crisis Now, that the United
States aerial bombing campaign was not merely useless to the war
effort but was also morally repugnant and a war crime.313 Contempo-
raneous with Shoup and Gavin, General Mathew Ridgway, a retired
and decorated World War II and Korean War veteran, also spoke
against the United States using massive bombing to try to subdue
communism in Vietnam.314
C. The Case of John Singlaub
On May 20, 1977, the Washington Post, on its tenth page, described
John Singlaub as an active duty general who had run afoul of the
Carter administration.315 Singlaub had recently criticized President
Carter’s plan at reducing the United States’ military presence in
South Korea.316 Singlaub was commissioned in the Army at the start
of World War II and served in the Office of Strategic Services, a fore-
runner of the Central Intelligence Agency. He took part in several
hazardous missions and then went on to command forces in the Ko-
rean War and in Vietnam.317 The Post conceded that Singlaub was a
decorated combat veteran of three wars but also noted that, while sta-
309. Letter from Senator George McGovern, U.S. Senate, to Gen. David Shoup, U.S.
Navy (July 2, 1969) (on file with the David Shoup Collection at the Hoover Insti-
tution Archives).
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NAM ERA 342 (1996).
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HEARINGS 35–39 (2006).
313. DAVID L. ANDERSON, THE HUMAN TRADITION IN THE VIETNAM ERA 166 (2000);
JAMES GAVIN, CRISIS NOW 21 (1968).
314. BUZZANCO, supra note 311, at 342.
315. Goerge C. Wilson, ‘Tough, Blunt, No-Nonsense Soldier:’ John Kirk Singlaub
Fought in 3 Wars, Now Embattled at Home, WASH. POST, May 20, 1977, at A10.
316. Id.
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tioned in Germany in 1961 as a lieutenant colonel, he had become an
admirer of Edwin Walker and had personally met with Walker to ex-
pand the general’s political training program to his own forces.318
This established a link from Moseley to Walker to Singlaub.
On April 28, 1979, the Washington Post, New York Times, and Los
Angeles Times all informed the nation on Singlaub’s retirement.319
Republican political leaders condemned Carter over Singlaub’s re-
moval from the Korean command. Former California governor and
presidential aspirant Ronald Reagan called Carter’s actions “disgrace-
ful” and “petulan[t].”320 On learning of Singlaub’s retirement, Senator
Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), a 1964 presidential candidate, issued a press
release stating: “The wrong man resigned today. . . . President Carter
has yet to come up with a military or foreign policy decision that
makes sense.”321 Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), a former vice presiden-
tial candidate who challenged Clinton for the presidency in 1996,
called Carter’s removal of Singlaub a “ ‘glaring’ and ‘rather thin-
skinned’ over-reaction to criticism of his foreign policy.”322
Because Singlaub himself was politically outspoken while on active
duty, and congressional conservatives used his service as a means to
attack Carter’s foreign policies, it should not have been surprising
that he would engage in controversial political conduct throughout his
retirement. He joined with Congressman Larry McDonald’s (D-GA)
Western Goals Foundation, a private anti-communist organization
that spied on United States citizens.323 Although Singlaub never
openly expressed anti-civil rights beliefs, McDonald frequently had
done so.324
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Singlaub also became the head of the World Anti-Communist
League and associated with other anti-communist organizations such
as the John Birch Society.325 In doing so, he raised money to support
Nicaraguan rebel forces trying to topple the Ortega government, as
well as other right-wing, anti-communist movements across the
globe.326 Singlaub’s involvement in the Iran-Contra Scandal became
well known through a series of investigations and news reporting.327
Although Singlaub was not alleged to have broken any laws, he associ-
ated with a cause in which Reagan Administration officials were in-
dicted and convicted for doing so.328
V. CONCLUSION: DONALD TRUMP AND THE JUNE CRISIS
OF 2020
On June 2, 2020, in the midst of nation-wide demonstrations de-
manding social justice and with sporadic violence occurring, President
Donald Trump threatened to use the active duty military as a police
force.329 One day earlier, federal and city law enforcement, including
the National Guard, were ordered to “clear” Lafayette Park in Wash-
ington D.C. in order for the President to walk to the church on the
other side of the park. At the time, none of the visible protesters were
engaged in violent acts, but several of the protesters were still seri-
ously injured by unknown law enforcement or National Guard
soldiers. Astoundingly, on July 9, 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Es-
per and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley testified to
the House Armed Services Committee that they did not know who is-
sued the order to clear the park of protesters for the president’s
benefit.330
In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson authorized the use of federal
military forces to curtail rioting in Detroit at the request of Michigan
Governor, George Romney.331 In 1992, President George H.W. Bush
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approved the use of the Army and Marine Corps to curtail rioting in
Los Angeles.332 In both instances, state governors sought presidential
assistance, but in June of 2020, President Trump threatened to pre-
empt governors and order the active duty military to enforce curfews,
conduct arrests, and perhaps fire weapons on citizens.333
When, in 2016, Trump campaigned for the presidency, there was a
significant question involving his exemption from the Vietnam-era
draft.334 Like President Clinton and President Grover Cleveland,335
President Trump avoided military service during a time of widespread
conscription. As in the case of Cleveland, however, his tenure as Com-
mander-in-Chief has proved controversial—among myriad of rea-
sons—because of his threat to use the military as a domestic police
force. Cleveland ordered the Army to safeguard federal interests dur-
ing the 1894 Pullman Strikes in order to protect federal governmental
operations, and the Army was instrumental in suppressing the
strike.336 But, in contrast to Trump, Cleveland served as Commander-
in-Chief over a comparatively small army.
Prior to June, 2020, Trump undertook several actions that
politicized the military to a degree reminiscent of the type of an armed
force Moseley and Walker, if not Wedemeyer, Fellers, and Willoughby,
sought. Two events contextualize Trump’s actions and the importance
of the responses of Powell et al. On April 22, 2020, the Department of
Defense noted that retired Brigadier General Anthony Tata would be
appointed as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USDP).337 The
USDP is the eighth-most senior position in the military establishment
and is responsible for duties as assigned by the secretary of defense as
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well as the integration of policy across the military.338 Following his
retirement, Tata had been an outspoken critic of President Barack
Obama to the point where he challenged the constitutional efficacy of
the presidency and conveyed racist statements in electronic messag-
ing and on Fox News in a manner similar to Moseley, Almond, Wede-
meyer, Walker, and Willougby.339 Yet as of August 1, 2020, the Trump
Administration had not rescinded Tata’s nomination.340 Indeed, on
July 20, 2020, the Trump Administration announced Richard Higgins
to serve as Tata’s chief of staff should Tata be confirmed by the Sen-
ate.341 Higgins, like Tata, has issued racially divisive statements, in-
cluding an accusation that Black Lives Matter is an agent of China.342
Tata’s nomination, and the consideration of Higgins, is troubling for
another, albeit related, reason. On May 30, 2019, the United States
Government Accountability Office determined that minorities in the
military were far more likely to be court-martialed for common of-
fenses than white service members.343 Thus, President Trump nomi-
nated a person for a senior level policy position who evidenced a
counter-commitment to equality and may have very well contributed
to a military climate favoring inequality.
On October 28, 2019, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman tes-
tified to closed sessions of the House Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, and
Oversight Committees regarding his knowledge on President Trump’s
activities in Ukraine.344 The House exercised its subpoena power to
compel Vindman’s testimony, though if Vindman had sought to testify
independent of a subpoena, the Court has recognized that service
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members do not lose the constitutional right to petition Congress.345
In response, President Trump announced he “fired” Vindman, and it
became likely that Vindman’s opportunity for military career advance-
ment—along with that of his brother who is also in the Army—was
curtailed because of White House retaliation.346 Moreover, more than
one of President Trump’s congressional allies alleged that Vindman
was disloyal to the United States because of his foreign birth.347 Presi-
dent Trump likewise alluded that Vindman was disloyal to the United
States.348
Added to this list could also be the pardons and commutations of
Caucasian service members who had been convicted of “war crime”
type offenses.349 At least one prominent military law scholar has
warned that the administration’s conduct in politicizing the military
and the abandonment of a commitment to hold service members who
commit war crimes accountable will prove deleterious to military dis-
cipline.350 And, in 2018, when incumbent Congressman Duncan
Hunter, Jr. (R-CA) sought reelection and alleged that his Democrat
opponent, who happened to be of Palestinian descent but had served
in the federal government, was a terrorist, three retired United States
Marine Corps generals joined with Hunter.351 Yet, the White House
did not issue any condemnation of Hunter or the generals, but instead,
supported his efforts.352
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Samuel Huntington observed, in citing to long-time journalist Wal-
ter Lippman, that “a schism between the generals of the Republican
Party and the generals of the Democratic Party would be ‘an almost
intolerable thing’ in the Republic.”353 Huntington also warned that
“[a] political officer corps, rent with faction, subordinated to ulterior
ends, lacking prestige but sensitive to the appeals of popularity, would
endanger the security of the state.”354 From the beginning of his presi-
dency, President Trump has referred to certain of the military’s senior
commanders as “my generals.”355 This statement ignored the fact that
generals and admirals—as with all officers—swear an oath to the
Constitution rather than a president. This is hardly the model of lead-
ership a professional and apolitical military aspires to, if, for no other
reason, then it loses the trust of the nation.
Thus, following President Trump’s—along with Attorney General
Barr, General Milley, and Secretary of Defense Esper’s—sojourn to
the St. John’s Episcopal Church, the Powell et al. responses were ar-
ticulated in a manner reflective of David Shoup and were within the
acceptable lex non scripta parameters of civil-military relations of the
United States. In other words, the conduct of Powell, McRaven, Mul-
len, Allen, Dempsey, Hayden, and Mattis was far distant from that of
Walker or Moseley. In contrast, President Trump’s apparent vision
for, and use of, the military was not only suggestive of a presidentially
desired politicized military, but one in which future generals may side
with causes such as Moseley and Walker because Trump enabled this
to occur. Thus, what Powell et al. accomplished was a powerful re-
minder to the current military, if not Congress and the citizenry—the
military has a constitutional duty to conform within its limited domes-
tic role and thereby exist as a guardian of the nation but not as a
means for enabling a president and his advisors to use the military as
a step toward tyranny.
09/03/us/politics/trump-sessions-midterms.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://
perma.unl.edu/LU9S-FHWX].
353. HUNTINGTON, supra note 35, at 460.
354. Id. at 464.
355. Mark Abadi, Trump Won’t Stop Saying ‘My Generals’ — and the Military Com-
munity Isn’t Happy, BUS. INSIDER (Oct 26, 2017, 12:24 AM), https://www.business
insider.in/Trump-wont-stop-saying-my-generals-and-the-military-community-
isnt-happy/articleshow/61231471.cms [https://perma.unl.edu/RWB5-LYS4].
